Free Riding in Religious Congregations: Can it be Eradicated? [Sanz]
Sergio Figueroa Sanz
Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
Widespread consensus regarding the free rider problem is that it arises in the context of publicly provided goods. Publicly provided private goods, where free riding is induced rather pertaining to the goods’ nature itself, are a familiar sight. Several studies have evidenced that free riders are also quite common among religious communities and tend to be more frequent as communities increase in size and market share. We extend the literature on this subject by arguing that in changing the way religious services are supplied for, free riding in religious congregations may be eradicated. The key consideration is that free riding in this context is an artificially induced problem. The introduction of a pricing mechanism for religious services would not only eliminate free riding but result in a more efficient allocation of resources in religious communities, provide for consistent information to religious leaders for strategic decision making, and foster the demand from adherents for accountability and service quality. Evidence showing the effect of some religious practices over desirable economic outcomes suggests that free riding eradication in religious congregations may have a relevant impact not only within congregations but across all markets where adherents participate, if we consider competitive scenarios in religious service provision.
File: Freeridingeradication_SergioFigueroa_MEXICO.pdf [816.61KB]
Published 11/02/2007
Filed under: (2007), *sanz, @asrec'07, congregations, free riding, religious markets
Free Riding, Market Structure, And Member Commitment [Hull, Lipford]
Brooks B. Hull
Jody Lipford
We use data on South Carolina Baptist congregations to address several questions related to religious market structure and member behavior:
1. Is there a free rider problem for larger denominations? That is, do per member donations decline as a denomination grows?
2. Does competition between Baptist congregations help or hurt Baptist congregations? That is, how does competition between congregations offering a “standardized” doctrine affect members?
3. Does competition between Baptist and non-Baptist congregations help or hurt Baptist congregations? That is, how does competition between congregations offering “non-standardized” doctrine affect members?
Previous empirical and theoretical work offers contradictory conclusions. We review the theory, clarifying some issues. Our empirical work is based on membership and donation data for about 1800 Baptist congregations in South Carolina. Results suggest that free riding increases as denominations grow larger, an effect mitigated by the increasing level of services offered as denominations grow. Competition between Baptist congregations reduces per member donations and competition with non-Baptist congregations increases per member donations.
File: BrooksHullSCChurch.doc [89.00KB]
Published 11/02/2007
Filed under: *hull, *lipford, @asrec'07, baptist, commitment, congregations, free-riders, free riding, history, religious markets
Strategic Congregational Management [Bejarano]
Hernan Bejarano
Pennsylvania State University
We developed a framework where the behavior of two types of agents in a society is modeled to represent the implicit problem faced by two types of rational agents. The first type of agent is a congregational leader who tries maximizes the size and stability of his congregation. The second kind of agents are the members of the society, these agents have to who have to choose which congregation they would like to join as well as for how long to stay as member in order congregations maximize their expected utility. We found that in the congregational monopoly environment the stability of the congregation is related to the ability of the congregational leader to influence the members of the congregation to impose a social cost on the possible defecting members
File: Bejarano almost done.pdf [162.88KB]
Published 11/02/2007
Filed under: (2007), *bejarano, @asrec'07, congregations, monopoly