Human Capital Accumulation and the Inter-Denominational Mobility of American Jews [Brickman]
Christine Brickman
Abstract: Despite the recent spate of research on religious and spiritual capital, scholars have yet to pay much attention to the distinction between general and specific capital. This distinction plays a central role in the economic theory of human capital, generating predictions concerning the type of training employers offer workers, and the impact of this training on both wages and labor market mobility. I apply these insights to religious markets and create testable propositions concerning the effect of these two types of capital on religious behavior and belonging. Drawing on data from the 2000 National Jewish Population Survey and 2000 National Survey of Religion and Ethnicity, I show why some individuals maintain low levels of participation despite having large quantities of specific religious capital. I also illustrate how larger stocks of capital increase switching to more traditional denominations within the Jewish “industry.” Finally, by understanding ethnicity as a type of specific capital, I explain the high retention rates that characterize religio-ethnic groups.
File:
Jewish_Mobility_Paper_-_Brickman2.doc [145.00KB]
File:
Jewish_Mobility_Paper_-_Brickman2.pdf [116.39KB]
Published 11/02/2007
Filed under: a:brickman, capital, conversion, education, general capital, jewish, njps, religious markets, s:asrec'07, specific capita, y:2007
Entry in Local Religious Markets [Sawkins, Mochrie, Naumov]
J.W. Sawkins, R.I. Mochrie and A.U.Naumov
Heriot-Watt University,
This paper analyses the entry of rival church denominations into local religious markets in late nineteenth century Scotland. Employing a version of the model developed by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991) data on market structure and population are used to derive probit estimates of entry thresholds. Reasons for the differences between entry thresholds across markets are analysed using historic institutional information. The results shed new light on the way in which church objectives, church financing and religious market structure combine to determine the pattern of entry in local religious markets.
File: SawkinsMochrieNaumovEntryinRelMarks.pdf [158.06KB]
Published 11/02/2007
Filed under: (2007), *mochrie, *naumov, *sawkins, @asrec'07, nineteenth century, religious markets, scotland
Triangulating the World’s Most Dynamic Religious Market: Africa Using a Quanti-Qualitative Method (QQM) [Grim]
Brian J. Grim
Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life
The African continent is arguably the world’s most dynamic religious marketplace, not only in terms of the growth of indigenous forms of Islam and Christianity but also the growing impact of African spirituality on the world. Despite this, empirical data on religion in Africa are scattered and lacking coordination. In this article I begin by briefly discussing important trends in the study of religion and public life. Then, applying what I have called the quanti-qualitative method (QQM), I describe the “triangulation” of three different types of information used to provide a richer understanding of religion and public life in Africa. First, I show how censuses, demographic surveys and public opinion surveys are used to develop well-sourced adherent estimates for countries. Second, I demonstrate how cross-national public opinion surveys are used to identify the type and intensity of attitudes, religious beliefs and reported behaviors among different demographic segments of countries. And third, I describe how deeper information on the regulation of religion and religious violence is obtained by coding major reports such as the U.S. State Department’s annual International Religious Freedom reports. I conclude with the argument that a clear understanding of religion is no longer an academic specialty – it is an academic necessity.
File: Grim_B_J_Triangulating_Religion_in_Africa.pdf [531.33KB]
Published 11/02/2007
Filed under: (2007), *grim, @asrec'07, africa, cross-national, religious markets
Free Riding in Religious Congregations: Can it be Eradicated? [Sanz]
Sergio Figueroa Sanz
Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
Widespread consensus regarding the free rider problem is that it arises in the context of publicly provided goods. Publicly provided private goods, where free riding is induced rather pertaining to the goods’ nature itself, are a familiar sight. Several studies have evidenced that free riders are also quite common among religious communities and tend to be more frequent as communities increase in size and market share. We extend the literature on this subject by arguing that in changing the way religious services are supplied for, free riding in religious congregations may be eradicated. The key consideration is that free riding in this context is an artificially induced problem. The introduction of a pricing mechanism for religious services would not only eliminate free riding but result in a more efficient allocation of resources in religious communities, provide for consistent information to religious leaders for strategic decision making, and foster the demand from adherents for accountability and service quality. Evidence showing the effect of some religious practices over desirable economic outcomes suggests that free riding eradication in religious congregations may have a relevant impact not only within congregations but across all markets where adherents participate, if we consider competitive scenarios in religious service provision.
File: Freeridingeradication_SergioFigueroa_MEXICO.pdf [816.61KB]
Published 11/02/2007
Filed under: (2007), *sanz, @asrec'07, congregations, free riding, religious markets
Free Riding, Market Structure, And Member Commitment [Hull, Lipford]
Brooks B. Hull
Jody Lipford
We use data on South Carolina Baptist congregations to address several questions related to religious market structure and member behavior:
1. Is there a free rider problem for larger denominations? That is, do per member donations decline as a denomination grows?
2. Does competition between Baptist congregations help or hurt Baptist congregations? That is, how does competition between congregations offering a “standardized” doctrine affect members?
3. Does competition between Baptist and non-Baptist congregations help or hurt Baptist congregations? That is, how does competition between congregations offering “non-standardized” doctrine affect members?
Previous empirical and theoretical work offers contradictory conclusions. We review the theory, clarifying some issues. Our empirical work is based on membership and donation data for about 1800 Baptist congregations in South Carolina. Results suggest that free riding increases as denominations grow larger, an effect mitigated by the increasing level of services offered as denominations grow. Competition between Baptist congregations reduces per member donations and competition with non-Baptist congregations increases per member donations.
File: BrooksHullSCChurch.doc [89.00KB]
Published 11/02/2007
Filed under: *hull, *lipford, @asrec'07, baptist, commitment, congregations, free-riders, free riding, history, religious markets
The Market for Martyrs [Iannaccone]
Laurence R. Iannaccone
Abstract: Despite its presence within all religious traditions, extreme self-sacrifice is by no means easy to explain. We rightly view most people who seek pain or death as mentally ill. Yet studies refute the seemingly obvious conclusion that religious self-sacrifice is likewise rooted in depression, obsession, or other forms of irrationality. Economic theory suggests ways in which many forms of sacrifice (such as restrictive diet, dress, and sexual conduct) can help groups produce collective goods and services otherwise lost to free-riding, but self-sacrifice aimed at injuring others has yet to be adequately explained.
Injury-oriented sacrifice can be modeled as a market phenomenon grounded in exchanges between a relatively small supply of people willing to sacrifice themselves and a relatively large number of “demanders” who benefit from the sacrificers’ acts. Contrary to popular perception, it is on account of limited demand rather than limited supply that markets for “martyrs” so rarely flourish. Suicidal attacks almost never profit the groups best equipped to recruit, train, and direct the potential martyrs.
Once established, however, a market for martyrs is hard to shut down. Supply-oriented deterrence has limited impact because: In every time, place, and culture, many people are willing to die for causes they value. Policies that target current supplies of martyrs induce rapid substitution toward new and different types of potential martyrs.
Demand-oriented deterrence has greater long-run impact because: The people who sacrifice their lives do not act spontaneously or in isolation. They must be recruited, and their sacrifices must be solicited, shaped, and rewarded in group settings. Only very special types of groups are able to produce the large social-symbolic rewards required to elicit suicide. Terrorist “firms” must overcome numerous internal and external threats, and even when successful they have trouble “selling” their services. Numerous social, political, and economic pathologies must combine in order to maintain the profitability of (and hence the underlying demand for) suicidal attacks.
File: Iannaccone - Market for Martyrs.pdf [113.91KB]
Published 12/01/2003
Filed under: (2006), *iannaccone, extremism, martyrs, rationality, religious markets, self-sacrifice
Deregulating Religion: The Economics of Church and State [Finke, Iannaccone, Stark]
Laurence R. Iannaccone
Santa Clara University
Roger Finke
Purdue University
Rodney Stark
University of Washington
Economic Inquiry
Western Economic Association International
Traditional religious research fails to recognize religion as a market phenomenon. It especially overlooks supply-side factors that shape the incentives and opportunities of religious firms, emphasizing instead demand-side shifts in the perceptions, tastes, and needs of consumers. This paper reviews the effects of government actions that alter religious supply. Our examples demonstrate that simple deregulation lies at the root of major religious trends and that the vitality of a religious market depends critically upon its competitiveness. (JEL: L51)
File: Iannaccone - Deregulating Religion.pdf [1.57MB]
Published 04/01/1997
Filed under: (1997), *finke, *iannaccone, *stark, @asrec'07, competition, deregulation, monopoly, religious firms, religious markets