

ASREC'09 Papers & Abstracts

Meetings of the Association for the Study of Religion, Economics, and Culture

Crystal City Hyatt Regency
(Arlington, VA)
April 2 – 5, 2009

** SUMMARY **

Thursday	7:00 – 9:00 pm	
	Registration & Welcome	
Friday	8:30 – 10:00 am:	1A – D
Friday	10:15 – 11:45 am:	2A – D
Friday	1:15 – 2:45 pm	3A – D
Friday	3:00 – 4:30 pm:	4A – D
Friday	4:45 – 6:00 pm:	Plenary 1
Friday	6:00 – 7:00 pm:	Reception
Friday	9:00 – 11:00 pm:	Social
Saturday	8:30 – 10:00 am:	5A – D
Saturday	10:15 – 11:45 am:	6A – D
Saturday	1:15 – 2:45 pm	7A – D
Saturday	3:00 – 4:30 pm:	4A – D
Saturday	4:45 – 6:00 pm	Plenary 2
Saturday	6:00 – 7:00 pm:	Reception
Saturday	9:00 – 11:00 pm:	Social
Sunday	8:30 – 10:00 am:	9A – B
Sunday	10:15 – 11:45 am:	10A – B

THURSDAY, APRIL 2

THURSDAY, 7:00 - 9:00 PM REGISTRATION AND WELCOME

FRIDAY, APRIL 3

FRIDAY, 8:30 - 10:00 AM

SESSION 1A: Religious Capital

Convener/Discussant: Wafa Hakim Orman, U. Alabama in Huntsville

"Rethinking Religious Human Capital"

Katie Corcoran, U. Washington

Extending the work of Iannaccone, this paper examines the effect of different types of religious capital on religious commitment. While organizational literature distinguishes 'general' and 'firm-specific' human capital and proposes that these types of human capital have different effects on commitment, little attention has been paid to this distinction in sociology of religion literature. I argue that individuals with more religion-specific religious capital should have higher levels of religious commitment. Additionally, I propose that religion-specific religious capital should have a greater effect on commitment than general religious capital. I test these propositions using survey data, where I attempt to measure religious capital directly. Previous research often operationalizes religious capital indirectly through proxy measures that may conflate the influence of religious capital with other variables (e.g., social capital). This paper disentangles different causal effects by using a direct measure of religious capital, while controlling for social capital and other important variables. Regression results provide support for the previous propositions.

"Historical Religious Concentrations and the Effects of Catholic Schooling"

Danny Cohen-Zada, Ben-Gurion U. the Negev (Israel)

Extending the work of Iannaccone, this paper examines the effect of different types of religious capital on religious commitment. While organizational literature distinguishes 'general' and 'firm-specific' human capital and proposes that these types of human capital have different effects on commitment, little attention has been paid to this distinction in sociology of religion literature. I argue that individuals with more religion-specific religious capital should have higher levels of religious commitment. Additionally, I propose that religion-specific religious capital should have a greater effect on commitment than general religious capital. I test these propositions using survey data, where I attempt to measure religious capital directly. Previous research often operationalizes religious capital indirectly through proxy measures that may conflate the influence of religious capital with other variables (e.g., social capital). This paper disentangles different causal effects by using a direct measure of religious capital, while controlling for social capital and other important variables. Regression results provide support for the previous propositions.

"Economics of Religious Conversion"

Adam Hogan, Middle Tennessee State U.

In this essay I test religious capital models by investigating empirically the causes of religious conversion in a large cross section of American youths. I attempt to avoid the endogeneity bias that is prevalent in previous efforts to estimate religiosity in order to identify causal effects. I find support for rational choice theories of religious behavior and religious capital accumulation. Religious capital is shown to be significant in determining the likelihood of changing religions as well as the likelihood of changing back to the faith in which one was raised. Furthermore, I argue that this study shows evidence of bargaining with religious organizations - as shown by the significant and positive effect on the likelihood of conversion from being diagnosed with an incurable disease.

"Spiritual Human Capital: Types and Economic Interrelationships"

Imran Nawaz, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics

Spiritual capital is relatively an emerging field of economics. Recent developments in the subfields of economics such as economics of religion (Iannaccone), divine economics (Hamdani), behavioral economics, brain scan economics and other social sciences had helped in finding the economic effects of different religious behaviors. Yet exists a long-felt need for a better understanding of spiritual capital (Iannaccone 1990, Iannaccone and Klick 2003, Hamdani 2006). Studies are now available, for example, majority of Americans think themselves as more spiritual than religious but these studies lack a clear distinction of spirituality and religiosity as most of them assume that being religious and being spiritual is same [Zinnbauer (1997), Roof (2000), Scott (2001), and Marler and Hadaway (2002)]. While some economists like Finke (2003), and Iannaccone and Klick (2003) attempted to define spiritual capital, however, their definitions still need more refinement for achieving a clear distinction between the concept of religious capital and spiritual capital. The works of Zohar and Marshall (2004), Rima (2005), and Liu (2007) have offered some advancement in this regard. But defining and analysing spiritual human capital as a further branch of social or human capital is still unexplored. The present paper focuses on defining spiritual human capital and its different types [Berger and Hefner (2004)], by utilizing the teachings of three divine religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam which more than three billion people follow on earth. A priori, on the basis of theoretical underpinning in Hamdani (2007), we hypothesize that different kinds of spiritual capital exists in different religions and sects. It is further hypothesized that different kinds of spiritual capital are likely to systematically affect the economic decision making of the individuals and hence create different intensities, directions, and magnitudes of spiritual human capital. The present study finds that spiritual human capital can be classified, accumulated, earned, and used at later time just like other forms of human capital. However, the determination of exact dimension and magnitude of spiritual human capital is only a partial objective of the present paper. For this purpose, cross section data available by Divine Economics Survey 2000 shall be used for the analysis. Keywords: Divine Economics, spiritual capital, spiritual human capital, religiosity, foregone income.

SESSION 1B: The Economic Impact of Islamic Teachings

Convener/Discussant: Garrett Jones, George Mason U.

"The Day the Debts Are Due: Exploring Islam's Conception of Divine Judgment, Heaven and Hell Using Rational Choice Theory"

Khuram Siddiqui, U. Michigan
Sarah Jawaid

This paper argues that new insights can be gained in the study of Islamic theology and Islamic law by applying rational choice theory and economic models of marginal utility to Islam's conceptions of divine judgment and the afterlife. Within Islam, both heaven and hell are viewed as continuums with differing levels of reward and punishment. This paper explores how Sunni Islam attempts to overcome collective action problems and address the issue of religious free-riding and religious procrastination by providing

selective incentives and collective punishments within Islam's conception of "The Rights of God" (huquq Allah) and "The Rights of Man" (huquq an-nas), as well as its conception of individual obligation (fard 'ayn) and collective obligation (fard kafa'i). This paper argues that it is the incentive structure of Islam's theology and Islamic law that partially explains Sunni Islam's ability to enjoy a conception of global community (umma) similar to Catholicism, but without Catholicism hierarchical structure.

"Influence of Workplace Religiosity on Transfer of Training in Banking Sector"

Ikramullah Shad, Air U. (Islamabad)

Syed Nisar Hussain Hamdani, Harvard U.

Transfer of Training depends on a number of factors like Trainees' characteristics, Training Design and Work Environment. (Baldwin & Ford 1988). Based on Divine Economics model (Hamdani, 2004) the present paper explores direction and magnitude of relationship between Workplace Religiosity and Transfer of Training (TOT). Since religiosity develops an internal system of monitoring and accountability, a more truly religious person does not consider only the number of hours of work put in by him for his organization, but also keenly observes himself as to how effectively he has delivered his services. Hence, persons with stronger religious beliefs are expected to effectively transfer knowledge, skills and abilities acquired during training, to their organization. The level of workplace religiosity resulting from adherence to prescribed religious practices is likely to create positive influence on TOT. Religiosity in work environment may not be "organizational" and may also be more of a personal trait, but personal ethics affect professional ethics which in turn raise organizational performance. Using cross section data of 237 bank officers in various banks in Islamabad / Rawalpindi area, collected by "Work Environment Survey of Bank-2007", the present paper finds that the Workplace Religiosity is an important factor in effective transfer of training. The paper also offers useful insight for economics, management and HRD and gives suggestions for organizations engaged in training of bank officers. Key Words: Work Environment, Transfer of Training, Divine Economics, Religiosity, Economics of Religion, Workplace Religiosity, Banking.

"Fiscal Crisis and Institutional Change in the Ottoman Empire and France"

Eliana Balla, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
Noel Johnson, George Mason U.

SESSION 1C: Religion and Culture

Convener/Discussant: J. Gordon Melton, Institute for the Study of American Religion

"The Rationality of Sacrifice in Ancient Greek Comedy"

John Rundin, U. California - Davis

Comic representations of Ancient Greek sacrifice make it clear that rational choice models are applicable to it. In ancient Greece, sacrificial ritual prescribed who got what portion of a sacrificed animal. In sacrificial banqueting, participants accepted their allotted portion and did not claim those of others. In fact, properly performed sacrificial banqueting was a metaphor for a properly functioning system of distribution in a social group. In comic representations of sacrifice, however, there is an emphasis on those who try to cheat by claiming sacrificial portions that

are not rightly theirs. So important to comedy are such defectors in the "sacrifice game" that their name "bomolochi" ("those who lurk around altars" trying to get an unmerited share) becomes a general term for clowning. The punishments meted out to such characters in Greek comedy confirm that sacrifice was a mechanism that regulated distribution of meat, which was a highly desired good.

"Evolving religious coordination through cues"

Joseph Bulbulia, Victoria U. Wellington

The following presents a cue-based signaling model for religion based on religion's benefits to coordination. The model is interesting because it: (1) Reveals a wide evolutionary path to religion. (2) Explains a conspicuous (an otherwise perplexing) low rate of change for religious culture; (3) Exposes important motivational support for otherwise fragile social conventions. Keywords: convention, cues, evolution, religion, morality, piety, sacred, signaling, stag hunt.

"A Cucumber for a Cow: The Rationality of Religious Hypocrisy"

Jason Wollschleger, U. Washington
Lindsey Beach

Drawing from the religious economies approach this paper offers a theory of religious hypocrisy based on the understanding that religion can be defined as the terms of exchange between a rational individual and his/her god(s). It follows that religious hypocrisy is a rational strategy for minimizing one's costs and maximizing one's rewards by cheating on his/her end of the exchange relationship i.e. cheating on his/her religious commitments. We argue that there are two main types of religious hypocrisy: subjective and objective. Subjective hypocrisy is cheating on subjective religious commitments (beliefs and emotions) in order to gain social rewards; whereas, objective hypocrisy is cheating on objective religious commitments (religious and moral behavioral requirements) in order to gain otherworldly rewards. We specify three types of social conditions that will lead to subjective religious hypocrisy, as well as argue that there are two different types of objective hypocrisy: acts of omission and acts of commission. We then hypothesize that these two types of objective hypocrisy will be more or less prevalent depending on the level of strictness of religious groups, and discuss the nonobvious implication that strictness poses a danger for the long-term vitality of religious groups.

"Ritual performance and acting under uncertainty"

Jesper Sørensen, U. of Southern Denmark

In this paper I will discuss a number of possible theoretical models aimed to explain the relation between the performance of stipulated ritual actions and the execution of actions with uncertain result. The Polish-English anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski noted the cultural ubiquity of such performances already in the early 20th century. However, so far no satisfying theory has been produced that explains why ritual performance are performed in relation to particular types of endeavors (and not others) as well as why they should have an effect on subsequent behavior. Based on results from evolutionary psychology and cognitive models of human action representation, I will propose a number of hypotheses that might help explain this phenomenon.

Keywords. Ritual actions, Magic, Uncertainty, Action representation, Cognitive psychology, Evolutionary psychology.

SESSION 1D: Churches and Firms: Incentives and Organization

Convener/Discussant: Janel Bakker, Catholic U. of America

"The Role of Leadership in Marketing Religious Organizations"

Mehmed Elezovic, Imam of DC Bosniak-American Islamic Community

The Role of Leadership in Marketing Religious Organizations The crucial mission of any religious organization and its leaders should be to serve the wants and needs of its religious communities. This can and should be done through use of marketing tools, analysis and questionnaires, to ascertain what types of services the religious community wants from its leadership. The observed problem seems to be that there is an increasing departure from this founding idea, towards a marketing approach that seems to serve the self-interest of religious leaders. The other problem seems to be that even if marketing was used for the right purpose, this, in majority of cases, is done by intuition rather than by proper marketing research which organizations should be trained to do. This research will prove that most current religious leaders do not use correct research methods in marketing and will outline ways to do the same.

"The Use of Cross-subsidy in the Free Church of Scotland"

Robert Mochrie, Heriot-Watt U.
John Sawkins, Heriot-Watt U.

To achieve its founders' objective of providing the ordinances of religion to the whole of Scotland without any dependence upon public financing, the Free Church of Scotland relied on its central Sustentation Fund to make stipend (salary) payments to ministers. The Fund used the large payments made by larger, wealthier, typically urban, congregations to meet the needs of poorer, smaller, typically rural, ones. Using congregations' financial returns from the second half of the nineteenth century, this paper analyses the Free Church's use of cross-subsidy to increase its penetration of religious markets in Scotland, and estimates the extent of these financial flows. The paper also draws upon annual reports of the Sustentation Fund Committee and other historical records to analyse the evolution of the Fund's operation as the Free Church sought to balance the interests of aid-giving and aid-receiving congregations, and to devise incentives encouraging the active support of both classes of congregation.

"Is a Higher Calling Enough? Incentive Compensation in the Church"

Jay Hartzell, U. Texas at Austin
Christopher A. Parsons, UNC
David L. Yermack, NYU - Stern School of Business

We study the compensation and productivity of more than 2,000 Methodist ministers in a 43-year panel data set. The church appears to use pay-for-performance incentives for its clergy, as their compensation follows a sharing rule by which pastors receive approximately 3 percent of the incremental revenue from membership increases. The

elasticity between ministers' pay and parish size is similar to the firm size elasticity of compensation for public company CEOs. Among a range of possible performance measures, those with the greatest informativeness about pastoral effort are linked most closely to compensation.

"Why Faith-Based Organizations Participate in Policy Networks"

Michael McGinnis, Indiana U.

The Charitable Choice provisions of the 1996 welfare reform and Pres. Bush's subsequent Faith-Based Initiative were intended to expand the role of faith-based organizations (FBOs) in the delivery of public services. These programs generated considerable controversy but had relatively few practical effects, since most FBOs that were both interested in and capable of partnering with the federal government were already integrated into the relevant policy networks. Even so, this topic is likely to be re-visited and perhaps re-invigorated during the administration of Pres. Obama. This paper uses recent innovations in game theory to examine the conditions under which FBO participation is likely to be expanded in different policy areas. Models of "games on a network" explore when participants in a network choose to establish direct connections with other nodes of that network or with actors currently outside that network. Making a new connection is a costly means to achieve some shared goal, and so any new connection must be mutually beneficial. In equilibrium, no pairs of participants or non-participants will choose to establish new connections. This paper develops a model comparing the costs and potential benefits of establishing new links in different kinds of policy networks (differing in substantive content, interest group configurations, mix of federal-state-local jurisdictions, and potential salience to members of different religious communities). Different configurations of contextual factors found in different substantive policy areas should lead us to expect to observe different networks of interaction among relevant political and religious organizations. My expectation is that specification of alternative equilibrium conditions can shed light on likely future patterns of expansion (or not) in the participation of FBOs in different policy areas.

FRIDAY, 10:15 - 11:45 PM

SESSION 2A: Weber Revisited: Religion and Capitalism

Convener/Discussant: Kimon Sargeant, Templeton Foundation

"The Spirit of Capitalism: Towards an Understanding of Congregations and Religious Beliefs and their Role in the Economy"

Stephanie Boddie, Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life

Capitalism is a vast system and even faith-based organizations are playing by its rules. This study seeks to understand congregations as organizations that promote the spirit of capitalism. In this study, religion is regarded as largely promoting saving, asset building and giving because it shapes values and priorities, provides important social networks and contributes to the sets of skills that lead to savings and investment behaviors (Weber, 1930). This is an alternative view to the prosperity gospel. This research is based on two sets of data: 1) city-wide cross-sectional study of congregations from a range of faith traditions (N=1392) and 2) qualitative study of 20 Latino and African-American congregations. Based on these data, it was found that

Catholic and other non-Protestant congregations had limited involvement in activities that promote capitalism as compared to their Protestant counterparts. Surprisingly, Latino Catholics had higher expectations than their faith leaders that the congregations would promote a spirit of capitalism such as saving for education or purchasing a home. These findings suggest that religious beliefs and practices can advance the spirit of capitalism in ways that benefit the members, the congregation, and the broader community.

"Weber Meets Smith: Religion and Economic Development Revisited"

Robert Subrick, James Madison U.

TBA

"The Economic Performance of Great Religions"

Paul Fudulu, U. Bucharest

Ultimately, institutions and cultural preferences are opportunity cost patterns in terms of all-inclusive mega-goods wealth and power while cultural preferences are preference rankings of collectivities for the same mega-goods. It is this trans-cultural perspective on institutions and cultures which makes possible that the consistency of a religion with economic performance to be looked at by taking into account religious rules and values which directly characterize mega-good power and only indirectly mega-good wealth. Consequently, besides criteria which have a direct bearing on the easiness to get wealth – the preference for absolute wealth, the type of asceticism, encouragement of saving and productive investment, the level of prohibition for interest - more numerous and better depicted criteria related to power can be employed such as: the kind of divinity, priests and churches as salvation mediators, encouragement of obedience, the type of social justice which is encouraged, man's power over woman, the kind of ecclesiastical organization. All of the six religions and a religion substitute which are analyzed – Judaism, Protestantism, Catholicism, Orthodoxism, Islamism, Confucianism and Buddhism - show almost the same rankings of consistency with economic performance for all direct and indirect criteria which are employed. Keywords: church, culture, economic growth, institutions, preferences

"Could what you don't know hurt you? Information Asymmetry in Medieval Land Markets"

P.V. Viswanath, Pace U.

Michael Szenberg, Pace U.

Markets in antiquity can provide valuable information about the importance of different factors in market pricing of assets. In this paper, we discuss a text from the Babylonian Talmud that deals with seasonal price and trading volume fluctuations in land markets in Roman Palestine. We argue that these fluctuations are probably due to information asymmetry and uncertainty regarding the value of land and the crops growing on that land.

SESSION 2B: Islamic Diversity: Gender, Identity, and Economics

Convener/Discussant: Paul Froese, Baylor U.

"Sociological Measures of Islamic Religiosity in Majority Muslim Countries: The Case of Kuwaiti College Students"

Alessandra González, Baylor U.

Western scholars are only just beginning to understand the complex and diverse history and socio-religious dynamics of the Islamic world that continue to shape Eastern and Western relations today. Using original data collected from surveys of 1139 Kuwaiti College students, we start to expand Durkheim's classic measures of religiosity: belief, behavior, belonging. In a majority-Muslim context, where certain rituals are prescribed and even regulated by the state, religious practice may not reflect individual piety, but simply serve as proxy for cultural norms. In this study, the research question is: in a Majority Muslim context, who considers him or herself more religious? This case study of Kuwaiti College Students suggests that: gender is still a powerful predictor of religious salience; religious school of thought, political affiliation, spiritual experience, behavioral measures, and cultural dimensions (like being raised religiously, but not necessarily wearing a beard or a face-veil) also appear to be important indicators of self-reported religiosity and are underestimated and studied in this context.

"Communism and Islam: A Match made in Heaven?"

Paul Froese, Baylor U.

TBA

"Islam or Islam-Lite? An Exploration of Religious Trends in Post-NATO Kosovo"

Shagufta Ahmed

Following the February 2008 declaration of Kosovo's independence, reports surfaced claiming Kosovo, a Muslim majority-state, as practicing "Islam-Lite" or a more diluted version of Islam. Outsiders, however, have been too quick to paint all Kosovars with the same religious brush. Such a representation disregards the role Kosovo's political history, particularly its history of communism and Slobodan Milosevic's campaign of ethnic cleansing, has played upon religious practice in the region. After the 1999 NATO invasion Kosovars found themselves not only confronting a new economic marketplace but also a new religious marketplace. Within the new religious marketplace Kosovars are experiencing more freedom in terms of their religious expression. Kosovo's transition from a pre-Milosevic to a post-Milosevic era has had a heterogeneous impact upon religious practice amongst Kosovars. Although formal data is sparse, preliminary mosque attendance data suggests religious participation differs substantially across age groups. This has substantial implications for policy makers as they shape the political structure of the world's newest liberal democracy.

"Integrating Muslims in Western Democracies: Reactive Identity, Islamism, and Mosque-State Relations"

Steven Pfaff, U. of Washington
Sarah Valdez, U. of Washington

TBA

SESSION 2C: Beyond the Religious Mainstream

Convener/Discussant: Massimo Introvigne, Center for Studies on New Religions

"Church and Cult in Virtual Worlds"

William Bainbridge, National Science Foundation

Virtual worlds are somewhat realistic online environments, in which people interact socially, economically, and culturally in

ways analogous to the real world. Religion is actually important in a diverse range of the existing virtual worlds, such as Second Life and World of Warcraft, in at least three ways. First, many worlds contain a significant amount of virtual religious architecture, such as cathedrals and chapels, which visitors can legitimately treat as sacred spaces. Second, the fictional religious movements that abound in gaming virtual worlds like World of Warcraft tend to be unconventional, promulgating neo-pagan mythologies and to a greater or lesser degree downplaying the standard religious traditions, potentially contributing either to secularization or to repaganization of western culture. Third, some real religious and post-religious movements have begun to use non-game virtual worlds like Second Life as a recruiting ground, thereby reaching beyond the limited potential recruitment pools in any given location, in building esoteric religious movements. This paper is based on 3,000 hours of participant observation and ethnography inside five of these worlds: Second Life, World of Warcraft, Anarchy Online, Tabula Rasa, and The Matrix Online.

"Reflection on Buddhist Demographics in America"

J. Gordon Melton, Institute for the Study of American Religion
Constance Jones, California Institute of Integral Studies

The estimated four million Buddhists in America exist almost invisibly within the larger religious community. Apart from a modest number of Asian-style temples, Buddhist centers tend to blend chameleon-like into the urban landscape. In 2009-10, the Institute for the Study of American Religion will conduct a survey of the American Buddhist community as part of the larger effort of the 2010 Religious Congregations and Membership Study conducted by the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies and the Glenmary Research Center. While previous such surveys have been largely limited to Christian churches, this year the full range of Asian religions will be included. Contemporary estimates of the American Buddhist community have been made utilizing a variety of sources from polls and book sales, to census data, however, until the present, no attempt has been made to actually count the number of Buddhists centers and their adherents. This effort will proceed in two stages, a survey of Buddhist centers in 2009 and an actual counting of membership, constituencies, and attendance at different activities in 2010. This paper will summarize the methodological challenges to the project and the findings of the initial survey of the centers.

"A Preliminary Demographic Analysis of an International Neopagan Denomination"

Emily Stevenson, Penn State U.
Benjamin McKune, Penn State U.

Studies linking religion and demographic trends have long been a part of the social scientific literature, from Durkheim's pivotal work on suicide to more recent studies on religiosity and fertility. However, these studies have typically focused on Western monotheistic religions which may or may not represent the complex religious landscape of the United States. A large scale, quantitative study of Neopagans in the U.S. has traditionally been problematic due to the lack of religious data collected by the U.S. census, and the difficulty of obtaining significant numbers of Neopagans in nationally representative surveys. In this study we propose a preliminary demographic analysis of the largest Neopagan Druidic organizations in the world, Ár nDraíocht Féin (ADF). Using comprehensive membership rolls, we will survey to all

current members of the ADF (around 1,100) regarding age, sex, race, marital status, and reproductive history. We will begin the analysis by running basic descriptive statistics on age, gender, education, income, and marital status. We will then explore the age composition of the population and calculate age-specific fertility rates. Finally, using existing records and survey data, we will determine the degree to which recent growth in the Neopagan tradition can be attributed to higher fertility levels.

"The Perils of Organizing Dangerous Religion: Organizational Contradictions and the Fall of Set Free Ministries"

Christine Woodman, Virginia Commonwealth U.
David Bromley, Virginia Commonwealth U.

A case-study of Set Free, a self-identified "biker-church" founded by former Hell's Angel, Phil Aguilar. The group emerged from the outlaw motorcycle-club (OMC) culture, and retains the OMC organizational structure and other elements of that culture. However, it is also the denominational and theological descendent of the ultra-conservative Baptist Bible Fellowship. The group's leadership and membership is derived almost entirely from the lowest socio-economic classes and its mission is to convert and to "restore" those with substance-abuse or criminal histories. Despite their initial success in fostering connections with community leaders and in garnering the respect of Christian and of OMC groups, the leader and core members of Set Free are now pariahs in the Christian community, under indictment for acts of street-terrorism and engaged in an armed conflict with a rival OMC. One source of conflict is the group's failure to return its converts to mainstream society; unlike other "restoration ministries" such as The Dream Center, Set Free maintains or fosters the marginalization of its converts by incorporating them into its semi-communal, quasi-deviant culture. However, the group's history demonstrates that the primary cause of conflict is its perceived incursions into the niches of other groups.

SESSION 2D: Book Session: The Economics of American Judaism

Convener/Discussant: Danny Cohen-Zada, Ben-Gurion U. the Negev (Israel)

- Laurence Iannaccone, George Mason U.
- Evelyn Lehrer, U. Illinois at Chicago
- Raphael Franck, Bar-Ilan U.
- *Response:* Carmel Chiswick, U. Illinois at Chicago

FRIDAY, 1:15 - 2:45 PM

SESSION 3A: The Impact of Religion on Income and Earnings

Convener/Discussant: Peter Coy, Economics Editor, BusinessWeek

"How Spiritual Capital promotes Economic Betterment: The Case of Dalit Conversions to Christianity in India"

Samual Shah Rebecca, Oxford Center for Religion and Public Life
rsamshah@mac.com

"The Earnings of American Jewish Men: Human Capital, Denomination and Religiosity"

Barry Chiswick, U. Illinois at Chicago

This paper analyzes the determinants of the earnings of American Jewish men using the 2000/01 National Jewish Population Survey. Non-response to the question on earnings is analyzed. Earnings are related to conventional human capital variables, as well as Jewish-specific variables. Except for the size of place and region variables, the standard human capital variables have similar effects for Jews and what is found in Census data for the general population. Jewish day schooling as a youth enhances earnings. Earnings vary by denomination, with Conservative Jews earning the most. The effect on earnings of religiosity (measured by synagogue attendance) is not monotonic. Earnings are highest for those who attend once a week. Thus, the highest earnings among Jewish men are received by those with more intense Jewish schooling (in addition to high levels of years of total schooling), and who engage in the practice of Judaism on a regular basis.

"The Growth of Protestantism in Brazil and its Impact on Income, 1970-2000"

Joseph Potter, U. Texas
Robert D. Woodberry, UT-Austin

Protestantism has expanded rapidly in Brazil in recent decades resulting in a substantial religious transformation in a country in which, not long ago, nearly all citizens were at least nominally Catholic. The churches that have grown the fastest have Pentecostal or neo-Pentecostal roots, such as the Assemblies of God or the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God. In this paper, we seek to assess whether the increase of Protestantism in Brazil has led increase in male income. We tackle the problem of selectivity using microdata from the Brazilian censuses of 1970, 1980, 1991, and 2000, analyzing the association between Protestantism and income at the group rather than the individual level. Protestantism has expanded rapidly in Brazil in recent decades resulting in a substantial religious transformation in a country in which, not long ago, nearly all citizens were at least nominally Catholic. The churches that have grown the fastest have Pentecostal or neo-Pentecostal roots, such as the Assemblies of God or the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God. In this paper, we seek to assess whether the increase of Protestantism in Brazil has led increase in male income. We tackle the problem of selectivity using microdata from the Brazilian censuses of 1970, 1980, 1991, and 2000, analyzing the association between Protestantism and income at the group rather than the individual level.

SESSION 3B: Religion and Social Stability

Convener/Discussant: Charles North, Baylor U.

"The Role of Islamic Law in European-Middle Eastern Trade Relations: the Middle Ages to World War I"

Timur Kuran, Duke U.

The Role of Islamic Law in European-Middle Eastern Trade Relations: the Middle Ages to World War I

"Monotheism (From a Sociopolitical and Economic Perspective)"

Murat Iyigun, U. of Colorado

Monotheism (From a Sociopolitical and Economic Perspective)

"Muslim and Hindu Literacy in Colonial India"

Jared Rubin, Cal State, Fullerton
Latika Chaudhary, Stanford U.

In this paper, we analyze the institutional roots underlying the persistent differences in Hindu and Islamic literacy in colonial India. Unlike previous comparative works, we eschew theories based on the "conservative" nature of Islam as an explanation for economic outcomes. Instead, we exploit a unique data set to argue that Islamic institutional arrangements formed in the Mughal Empire - in which political authority depended on religious authority for legitimacy - left a legacy in which Qur'an reading schools (which did not generally support literacy) drew in Muslim students while crowding in Hindus into colonially subsidized public schools.

"Oil, Revolutions and Wars: The Islamic Revival 1961-1988"

Eric Chaney, Harvard U.

This paper examines the causes of the Islamic Revival using a novel panel data set of Hajj attendance from 1961-1988. Results show a sharp increase in Hajj attendance after the start of the Revival suggesting that Hajj attendance is a good proxy for religiosity. Although the paper finds some evidence that the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict led to an increase in religiosity, other traditional explanations for the Islamic Revival are not supported by the data.

SESSION 3C: Health and Education

Convener/Discussant: John Nye, George Mason U.

"If the Shoe Fits: Estimating Returns to Religious Matching in Education"

Catherine Pakaluk, Harvard U.

This paper explores the possibility that there is some intangible degree of "fit" between students and schools, observable to parents but non-verifiable, that affects student outcomes independently of school quality. While a full description of a good fit should be multi-dimensional, I begin by investigating whether religious matching is one possible vector along which students and schools might pair to make more (or less) productive matches. I describe various models which could account for effects of matching on observed student outcomes. Finally, I use NLSY97 data to estimate returns to matching after controlling for observables. I correct for selection bias using an instrumental variables strategy based on differential distances between matched and unmatched schools. I find positive and significant returns to matching in both the OLS and IV models. I conclude by extending the logic to other social services (such as work-based welfare programs, health care, and even prison programs), suggesting that goodness of fit between providers and recipients of social services may have serious bearing on the productive efficiency of these public goods.

"A Postsecondary Revival"

David Mustard, U. Georgia
Neil Meredith

Neil R. Meredith Department of Economics Terry College of Business 507 Brooks Hall University of Georgia Athens, GA 30602 nrmered@uga.edu (706) 424-5138 and David B. Mustard Department of Economics Terry College of Business 531 Brooks Hall University of Georgia Athens, GA 30602 mustard@terry.uga.edu (706) 542-3624 ABSTRACT

Using institution level data from the National Center for Education Statistics' Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), we explore the degree to which enrollment has grown from 1986 to 2006 in religiously affiliated post-secondary institutions relative to their counterparts. We examine growth in total enrollment, enrollment by gender, ethnicity, and race. After controlling for institutional characteristics we find that enrollment in religiously affiliated colleges and universities has grown 9.0 percent more than institutions that have no religious affiliation. The growth has been largest among blacks (19.5 percent) and hispanics (16.3 percent). Because simply having a religious affiliation can have little or no bearing on an institution's policies and mission, we evaluate whether the intensity of an institutions' attachment also affects enrollment gains. Enrollment gains in institutions in the Council for Christian Colleges and Universities (CCCU), for whom faith is a direct determinant of institutional mission, have been significant. For example, after controlling for other factors total enrollment grew 19.1 percent and enrollment of blacks grew by 36.2 percent relative to their peers. Institutions with the strongest religious attachments have experienced the largest enrollment gains in the past 20 years.

"Rational praying: The economics of prayer"

Timothy Brown, U. California at Berkeley

Prayer, both public and private, is prescribed by most religious traditions. Patterns of prayer are theoretically derived from an economic theory of spiritual health which is, in turn, derived from the Grossman model of the demand for physical health. The theory makes the following predictions with regard to the frequency of prayer: wages are predicted to correlate negatively, education is predicted to correlate positively, environmental factors that are supportive of prayer are predicted to correlate positively, and the expected "price" for participation in religious activity (the tithe in Judaism and Christianity and the Zakat in Islam) is predicted to correlate negatively. Empirical tests of the theory using data from the 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 waves of the General Social Survey and the U.S. Census' County Business Patterns are performed using generalized least squares with state and year fixed effects. The predictions of the model are supported for females, but only partially supported for males.

"Exploring Diversity in the U.S.: Children in Interracial Families"

Nadwa Mossaad, Population Reference Bureau (DC)

The last several decades have seen profound changes in the racial and ethnic composition of the U.S. population. According to the trend, by midcentury, the nation's minorities will become the majority. Thanks to the influx of racial minority immigrants into the United States, the tendency to marry within ones racial or ethnic group is becoming less common. The high growth in the Asian and Hispanic population and their impact on interracial relationship are changing the way Americans think about race. My goal in this paper is to examine how children in interracial families compare with those in racially endogamous families. Using data from the U.S. Census, I first give an overview of the trend in interracial marriages and examine the educational attainment and income of the couples. Second I use other data sets to compare key national indicators of child well being including poverty, health and education.

SESSION 3D: Ethics and Markets

Convener/Discussant: Larry S. Landrum, Virginia Western Community College

"Markets and Moral Reflection"

James Halteman, Wheaton College

This paper explores three alternative readings of the ethical foundations of market economics. 1) Drawing on Adam Smith's moral philosophy, moral reflection is seen as a prerequisite for successful markets. 2) From post Smithian Classical economists effective rules of the game are sufficient for market activity and moral content is not as important for effective markets. 3) From works like Dierdre McCloskey's approach, moral content is needed for markets but the markets themselves foster virtues that make the system viable. Which reading one takes will depend on the political/economic philosophy and theology of the reader. Critical issues will include a) how depraved or inclined toward virtue is human nature. b) how radical is the religious calling to which one subscribes c) is the social order organic or mechanistic d) is behavior primarily driven by the senses and emotions or by rational processing and e) to what degree do consequences validate a system. The paper ultimately takes the first view arguing that there is telos in Smith's moral philosophy. From that perspective the five critical issues are analyzed. The paper concludes with the implications of this for rational choice methodology. (I realize this is late. My earlier submission was by email and in the end of semester flood of emails etc. I missed this process change. If the topic is relevant to the conference and can still be considered, I would be happy to contribute to the conference.

"Economic Efficiency, Economic Ethics, and Health Care"

Earl Grinols, Baylor U.

Association for the Study of Religion, Economics, and Culture Annual Meeting April 3-5, 2009 Hyatt Regency, Crystal City (Washington, DC) (Originally filed 27 August 2008) Earl L. Grinols Department of Economics Baylor University One Bear Place #98003 Waco, Texas 76798-8003 Email: Earl_grinols@baylor.edu Phone: 254-710-7522 Title: Economic Efficiency, Economic Ethics, and Health Care Topics/Methods: Education, human capital, health, and happiness, Politics, public choice/finance, church-state issues, and the law Abstract: Proposals to achieve universal health insurance coverage deal with notions of economic efficiency implied by rules of public finance and selected equity issues and economic ethics. Thus the special nature of health care requires scholarship directed to the proper division between the state, the individual, and voluntary private organizations of the assignment of health care responsibilities. This paper examines the dictates of economic efficiency regarding the public objectives of universal health care—thus remains squarely in the economics efficiency framework—and finds that a consistent, virtually conceptually unique framework results if economic efficiency and economic ethics are jointly considered. The framework that efficient intervention implies contains overlooked features regarding the type of incentives used to expand coverage, the way insurance is offered, market rationalizations for health care itself, and control over the program budget. Ethical grounding, Christian doctrine regarding charity, Samuelsonian public good/private good distinctions, and concepts of wealth distribution are elements to fully addressing and

understanding the issues in the public domain regarding health care.

"Environmental Creationism"

Robert Nelson, U. Maryland

There is an implicit creationism in much of environmental thinking. Environmentalists feel that they are seeing the handiwork of God when they visit wild nature. This is a new secular version of the traditional Christian feeling of being in the presence of God when encountering "the Creation" in nature. Environmentalism is a new religion and, as this illustrates, it often draws heavily from original Christian sources, even while this is often not recognized. Based on new book: Robert Nelson, *Economic versus Environmental Religion: The New Holy Wars*, Penn State Press, Fall 2009.

"A Divine Economics Perspective on Efficiency of Workers"

Syed Nisar Hssain Hamdani, Harvard U.

Mirza Mohammad Shahzad, U. of Karachi

Zahid Siddique

Efficiency of workers is a matter of concern for all types of public and private organizations; with operations ranging from local to multinational levels. The conventional economics finds efficiency wage as a strong determinant of workers efficiency (...). According to this hypothesis: workers will work with honesty, dignity, loyalty and efficiency when they are paid above market clearing wage rate. The divine economics, however claims that the objective which is achieved through the 'efficiency wage' may be achieved with increasing religiosity among worker. This claims is based on rational choice of worker who believes in a life that has two phases; life and afterlife. They maximize total monetary and non-monetary returns from supply of labor under the divine rules for workplace. Thus the increase in religiosity shall shift the supply curve of labor upward. On the demand side, firms will prefer to choose those workers, even at higher, wages, for initial appointment, overtime work opportunities, and further promotions who appear to be more (truly, and not mere ritually) religious thus shifting demand curve outward. The final equilibrium outcome is similar in case of 'efficiency wage' or religiosity based scenarios as in both cases, wages shall be higher than a reference wage level, but will be different in terms of other impacts. For example efficiency wage model requires high expenditure on workers' monitoring while religiosity inculcates an internal supervisor. Moreover with increase in cumulative human capital, it is more likely that workers leave a job suddenly causing serious losses for the firm whereas under religiosity criteria, workers shall hardly run away suddenly when so doing is harmful for the employer, rather they would prefer to first negotiate or to wait till the firm hires a next suitable worker. If the claim of Divine Economics come true through empirical evidence from real world situation, it would perhaps be more profitable to allocate larger funds for promotion of religion and morality among workers rather than paying them so-called 'efficiency wage' leading to monopsonic market structure. With this background, the present study has the following objectives: a) A brief review of conventional economics regarding efficiency wage hypothesis, b) A survey of Divine Economics, c) A brief review of moral and jurisprudential aspects of employee, employer and the state with reference to workers efficiency, d) Results of a few case studies, and e) A rationale for a faith-based theory of workers' efficiency. Using the first ever

'Divine Economics Survey 2000', some empirical results shall be presented to elaborate the case.

FRIDAY, 3:00 - 4:30 PM

SESSION 4A: Thriving in the Face of Adversity: Communities of Faith

Convener/Discussant: Christopher Crowe, International Monetary Fund

"The Dynamic Effect of Economic Shocks on Religiosity: Evidence from the Seventh-Day Adventist Church"

David Beckworth, Texas State U.

Do changing economic conditions affect the level of religiosity? This question is explored in this paper using quarterly data from the Seventh-day Adventist church for the period 1950:Q1 – 2008:Q1 in a vector autoregression with macroeconomic variables. This paper finds that SDA religiosity is sensitive to economic shocks and that about a third of the forecast error in SDA religiosity can be explained by such shocks. Key Words: Religiosity, Economics of Religion, Business Cycle, Vector Autoregression

"A Theory of Islamic Revival"

Jean-Paul Carvalho, U. Oxford

There has been a dramatic surge in Islamic belief and identification since the 1970s. We develop a formal theory of the social and psychological mechanisms behind this Islamic revival. Modernization programs undertaken by Muslim nations led to the emergence of a new middle class. As growth stagnated in the 1970s and 1980s, the economic inequalities created in the development process crystalized. Income inequality, low social mobility, conspicuous consumption of imported luxury goods by the uppermiddle class and the deteriorating absolute conditions of the lower-middle class combined to heighten sentiments of envy. We develop a model in which religious belief serves as a coping mechanism for envy by placing less weight on material consumption and greater weight on moral virtue. As inequality fuels the spread of religious belief in the population, virtue weighs more heavily in social judgments. To mitigate shame, agents begin to adopt markers of religious identity (e.g. the veil) to signal their religious beliefs and commit themselves to abiding by religious proscriptions. We discuss how the strict Islamic moral code and the sexual revolution in the West intensified this process of religious revival.

"Economic Activity and Church Attendance"

Paul Olson, Briar Cliff U.

David Beckworth, Texas State U.

In this paper we explore the impact of economic activity on church attendance by examining the weekly church attendance from two congregations in the state of Iowa - one Lutheran and one Episcopalian - from the 1940s to the present. We provide a brief history of both congregations and show how seasonal variations in attendance exist throughout all of the years under consideration. We then use Vector Autoregression to determine the impact of employment and commodity prices on church attendance. The results differ for the two congregations, and we argue that the socio-economic composition of the congregations may play a role in their divergent responses to economic shocks.

SESSION 4B: Islam and Collective Action

Convener/Discussant: Omar Al-Ubaydli, George Mason U.

"Mosques in the American Metropolis"

Khuram Siddiqui, U. Michigan

Sarah Jawaid

This paper explores how differences in urban vs. suburban context influence the membership and activities of American mosques within Detroit, Los Angeles, and Washington D.C. area. Within the field of urban politics, it has been established that the quality of public services provided to citizens varies significantly in the American metropolis based on whether one lives in an urban or suburban neighborhood. This paper uses the insights gained from urban politics to explore the differences in the quality and quantity of religious services provided between urban and suburban mosques. We believe mosques are especially interesting to study in the American metropolis, as compared to Christian churches, due to the fact that the congregational prayer of mosques occurs midday at Friday. This creates an interesting phenomena of a specific group of commuter worshippers who attend their Friday congregational prayers in an urban mosque, but primarily associate with a suburban mosque closer to their place of residence. This unique quality of Muslim religious life in America provides an opportunity to explore how both urban and suburban American mosques obtain material support and commitment in order to provide religious services while at the same time confronting variations in opportunity costs due to differences in location not observed in Christian churches.

"The emergence of local social orders in Iraq"

David Siddhartha Patel, Cornell U.

After the U.S.-led overthrow of the Saddamist Baath regime in April 2003, state provision of public goods in Arab-majority areas of Iraq vanished and did not quickly restart. Yet residents in some localities substituted for the state and collectively provided local security, traffic order, and fresh water supplies, while others did not. I argue we can explain variation of this sort through a focus on the distribution of and control over information. Iraqi Arabs faced new situations where cooperation with neighbors was the most efficient route to cope with local issues. Post-invasion cooperation, therefore, demanded Iraqis to form shared expectations about the behavior of other Iraqis in unforeseen situations. This requires common knowledge, which is knowledge of others' knowledge. Baathist authoritarianism, however, destroyed organizations and social practices that generate this form of information. Muslim religious leaders controlled the most natural way for Iraqis to get this sort of information and form shared behavioral beliefs. Friday mosque sermons create common knowledge within geographically defined congregations. If attendees believe that others will act on messages, sermons can coordinate residents on priorities, norms of behavior, contributions, and punishment of shirkers. Localities with a single Friday mosque should be better providers of public goods than comparably sized localities that had no Friday mosque or more than one. I test this and related conjectures with ethnographic and other data I collected during eight months field research in Basra in 2003-04, including structured comparisons and GIS data on

mosques and local councils to analyze the spatial emergence of order post-invasion.

"Muslim Collective Action in Europe: the role of theologies and club goods"

Carolyn Warner, Arizona State U.

This paper addresses the question of on what grounds do individual Muslims coordinate to alter government regulations affecting their religious practices? How do the religious beliefs, organizational structures, and material interests of Muslim denominations and sects affect the interactions of Muslims in the public sphere? I hypothesize that cooperation and conflict between Muslims, and by extension, between interest groups, varies depending on whether the resource being sought is a club or public good. To evaluate this proposition and to answer broader questions about the role of religious beliefs in conflict and cooperation between Muslim groups, this paper studies the coordination efforts among Muslims in two policy areas in two countries. The policy areas are attempts to obtain permission for Islamic burial practices at public cemeteries and the establishment of full-service community mosques. In order to take into account the variety of Muslim religious groups and nationalities in Europe and to evaluate various dimensions of religion, the paper does a close analysis of paired case studies of these topics within France (Mulhouse and Grenoble) and Switzerland (Basel and Lausanne). The analysis is supplemented by comparisons with "grand mosque" projects in several major European cities. This analysis of Muslim collective action to obtain permission for Muslim burial practices in cemeteries and to establish full-service community mosques will add significantly to our understanding of Muslim communities in Europe and how religious orientations enter into and affect conflict and cooperation.

SESSION 4C: Measuring Members and Movers

Convener/Discussant: Sean Everton, Naval Postgraduate School

"Religious switching between childhood and adulthood in the U.S."

Barry Kosmin, Trinity College

The rate of religious switching in the U.S. is in dispute. According to the American Religious Identification Survey 2001 about 16% of U.S. adults reported in that at some point in their lives they had changed their religious preference or identification. However, The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life in 2007 reported that 28% adults have switched to another religion or no religion. It claimed that the rate of switching is 44% if changes in affiliation from one type of Protestantism to another are included. Results of a new study will provide the most complete picture of current trends in religious identification and switching. The American Religious Identification Survey 2008 is based on a nationally representative sample of adult respondents. Replicating the methodology of ARIS 2001, it will be the only national survey to use completely open-ended responses on current religious identification and use religious identification at a specific age, 12 years. It should, among other things, resolve discrepancies between the earlier surveys on religious switching. An analysis of the social and demographic dynamics propelling the growth in the population of "Nones" will also be offered.

"Who's Misbehavin'? Improving the Identification Method of the Affiliated Non-Religious"

Christine Brickman Bhutta, Catholic U. of America
Christopher Born, Catholic U. of America

Recent survey data reveal a rise in the "affiliated non-religious" – those who continue to affiliate with a particular denomination despite having low levels of religiosity. To define membership in this group, survey analysts establish minimum standards of objective religious beliefs and behaviors that override the subjective religious identification of those who fall below the threshold. Currently, these measures are uniform across denominational lines. We believe this method overlooks the relative importance different religious traditions place on specific beliefs and behaviors, miscategorizes respondents, and inhibits our ability to draw accurate comparisons both within and across denominations. Church attendance, for example, is theologically mandatory for Roman Catholics but not for some Protestant denominations. Using combined data from the 1998 and 2008 GSS, we offer a new classification scheme to identify "affiliated non-religious" based on the normative beliefs and behaviors of three religious traditions: Mainline Protestant, Evangelical Protestant, and Roman Catholic. In addition to more accurately identifying nominal Christians, the new scheme provides insight into the residual cultural influence of each particular religious tradition despite the respondents' nominal status.

"The Zeal of the Convert: Religious Characteristics of Americans who Switch Religions"

Greg Smith, Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life
Allison Pond, Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life
Neha Sahgal, Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life
Scott F. Clement, Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life

Religion in the United States is often described as a vibrant marketplace where individuals pick and choose religions that meet their needs, and religious groups are compelled to compete for members. The Religious Landscape Survey, conducted in 2007 by the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, estimates that roughly 44% of Americans now profess a religious affiliation that is different from the religion in which they were raised. This paper briefly details patterns of membership gain, loss and retention among religious groups and describes the demographic and religious characteristics of the many Americans who are "on the move" religiously. It also takes a deeper look into six of the largest religious groups, including evangelical Protestants, mainline Protestants, members of historically black Protestant churches, Catholics, Mormons and the religiously unaffiliated. A comparison of the religious beliefs and behaviors of converts with the religious beliefs and practices of lifelong members of these faiths allows us to measure the "zeal of the converts," that is, the extent to which converts in various religious traditions exhibit higher levels of religious observance compared with lifelong members.

SESSION 4D: Religious Markets

Convener/Discussant: S. Ramachandran, The World Bank

"Rethinking Religious Competition"

Dan Hungerman, Notre Dame U.

In recent years there has been a surge of interest in applying economic analysis to religious topics. The plurality of work on this topic has focused on how religious organizations' decisions and outcomes depend upon the

competitive forces in the local environment—especially competition from other congregations. But despite the attention devoted to this topic, this area of work has produced essentially no firm conclusions with little agreement about what constitutes competition, the right hypotheses to test, or whether this area of work is useful at all. In this paper I discuss some of the key sources of this confusion and I describe how some recent research, most of which broadens the conception of “competition” to include secular factors, avoids a number of the theoretical and empirical pitfalls that have plagued much prior work.

"Bend It Like Beckham: Ethnic Identity and Integration"

Alberto Bisin, New York U.

Eleonora Patacchini, UNC

Thierry Verdier, Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)

Yves Zenou, Stockholm U.

We propose a theoretical framework to study the determinants of ethnic and religious identity formation. We distinguish formally between two distinct motivational processes for identity formation which have been proposed in the social sciences: cultural conformity and cultural defense. The unique information on ethnic preferences and attitudes provided by the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities in the UK enables us to test the relative preponderance of these two motivating processes. We find evidence consistent with intense ethnic and religious identity to be formed mostly as a cultural defense mechanism. Consistently, we document that identity and socialization to an ethnic or religious minority are, other things equal, more intense in mixed neighborhood than in segregated neighborhoods. We argue that this results have important and up-to-now unnoticed implications for integration and assimilation policies. Key words: Ethnicity, identity, intermarriage, cultural transmission

"The Future of American Religion to 2050"

Eric Kaufman, Harvard U.

This paper, based on the General Social Survey of 1972-2005, uses multi-state, cohort-component methods to project the future size of the main religious denominations in the United States. In addition to considering denominational makeup, the paper tests the religious restructuring perspective by projecting the relative size of 'literalist' and 'modernist' religious belief segments, as well as pro-choice and pro-life segments, regardless of denomination. Religion has emerged as one of the strongest electoral cleavages in the United States. Evangelical Protestants, Hispanic Protestants, traditionalist white Catholics and ultra-Orthodox Jews incline toward the Republican Party, while the nonreligious, African-American Protestants, Hispanic Catholics and theologically liberal Protestants, Catholics and Jews lean toward the Democrats. Measures of religiosity perform well in multivariate analyses of voting behaviour, especially in recent federal contests. (Guth et al. 2004) The shape of the American religious marketplace is therefore extremely important if we wish to grasp the social dynamics driving American politics. An obvious source of religious change are the conscious choices of religious 'consumers' who switch between denominations. However, those who study the religious marketplace in the United States have been as impressed by the extent to which denominations have 'grown their own' through demography: notably immigration and fertility advantage. Sherkat, for example, finds that American Catholics have been able to offset large net losses to other denominations through gains arising from

(largely) Hispanic-Catholic immigrants and their higher fertility. Fertility differentials can also play a key role - especially in the long term. Mormons, once a very small sect, now equal or surpass Jews among post-1945 birth cohorts due to their fertility advantage over Jews and other denominations. (Sherkat 2001: 1472-4) Conservative Protestants, a much larger group than the Mormons, also benefit from relatively high fertility. Using the General Social Survey, Roof and McKinney (1987) noted that Southern Baptists had roughly twice the fertility of Jews and secular (unaffiliated) Americans. A recent article extends this finding by showing that three-quarters of the growth of conservative Protestant denominations is due to fertility rather than conversion. (Hout et al. 2001) This has powered the growth of the religious right and increased the base of the Republican party. Indeed, a recent article demonstrates the extremely significant and robust correlation between non-Hispanic white fertility patterns and the Republican vote - especially in 2004. States whose white population tends to be liberal and postmaterialist have lower fertility - as per 'second demographic transition' theory (SDT) - and a lower pro-Bush vote share. This effect largely runs through denominational liberalism/conservatism. (Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006) Finally, some observers record an increase in the proportion of Americans without religious affiliation to 14 percent in the 1990s. (Hout and Fischer 2002). >>To date, no scholars have built on the wealth of retrospective data on fertility and switching patterns available through the GSS to produce scenario-based cohort-component projections of the proportion of the American population that will be Fundamentalist Protestant ('fundamentalism' is derived from a GSS question), moderate Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, Other and None in the future. We will then subdivide the religious categories somewhat to delimit Hispanic Protestant, Hispanic Catholic and African-American Protestants from white categories. We will also project the politically more salient categories of 'literalist'/'modernist' and 'pro-choice'/'pro-life'. >>Given the established US Census Bureau practice of projecting by race to 2050, the absence of religious projections forms a surprising gap in the literature. On the one hand, the lack of a census question on religion explains the lack of work in this area. However, the wealth of data from the General Social Survey (GSS) linking religion to demographic variables since 1972 offers a fantastic opportunity to fill this gap in the literature. Religious projections take into account the age and sex structure of each denomination's population, as well as total fertility and mortality rate. In addition, we account for transitions due to switching (including to none) and immigration. Much of this work has been undertaken by our team at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) near Vienna, leaders in multi-state projections research, who have pioneered this kind research based on their own specialized PDE software. Projections are only as good as their assumptions, hence we shall provide a number of different scenarios based on assumptions about denominational fertility and switching trends, as well as immigration levels. These will be grounded in retrospective trends. This follows from our previous work on Austria and Switzerland, i.e. Goujon, Skirbekk et al. 2006)

FRIDAY, 4:45 - 6:00 PM

SESSION 4P: Plenary Session - 1

Convener/Discussant: Laurence Iannaccone, George Mason U.

"Towards a Seriously Religious Economics"

Deirdre McCloskey, U. Illinois at Chicago

TBA

FRIDAY, 6:00 - 7:00 PM: RECEPTION

FRIDAY, 9:00 - 11:00 PM: Evening Social

SATURDAY, APRIL 4

SATURDAY, 8:30 - 10:00 AM

SESSION 5A: Religion, Youth, and Well-being

Convener/Discussant: Alicia Adsera, Princeton U.

Discussant: Niels-Hugo Blunch, Washington and Lee U.

"Religion, Risk Behaviors, and Intimate Partner Violence in Chile: Macro- and Micro- Level Influences"

Evelyn Lehrer, U. Illinois at Chicago

Vivian Lehrer

Ramona Krauss

The Catholic Church has had a strong influence on the Chilean legal landscape in ways that have adversely affected victims of gender based violence, e.g., it succeeded until just four years ago in blocking efforts to legalize divorce. At the same time, research based on micro data shows a favorable influence of religion: young women raised with some religion tend to have healthier, less risky lifestyles, and are less likely to be victims of intimate partner violence. This study explores the puzzle posed by these seemingly opposing macro- and micro- level forces. Results based on data from the 2005 Survey of Student Well-Being, a questionnaire on gender based violence administered to students at a large public university in Chile, show that moderate or low levels of religiosity are associated with reduced vulnerability to violence, but high levels are not. This non-linearity sheds light on the puzzle, because at the macro level the religious views shaping Chile's legal landscape have been extreme.

"Religion and Child Health"

Donka Mirtcheva, The College of New Jersey

Barry Chiswick, U. of Illinois at Chicago

Studies have found a positive association between religion and mental health and mixed evidence between religion and physical health for adults. However, little is known about the relationship between religion and child health. This paper examines the effect of child and parental religious human capital (affiliation, importance, and attendance) on health (overall and mental) for children ages 5-19. Religion is hypothesized to have a positive effect on health, which increases with child's age due to improved understanding and involvement in church activities for older children. The 1997 and 2003 Child Development Supplements to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) are enhanced with PSID family characteristics. The estimated probit, ordered logit and multinomial logit models control for child and family demographics. Religious affiliation is found to improve child overall and mental health as compared to children of no religion/atheist/agnostic. This positive effect becomes stronger for older child age groups. Church attendance and importance of religion improve health outcomes for children

ages 12-15. Overall, as in the adult literature, religion is found to have a positive impact on health for children, especially ages 12-15, suggesting that the protective health effect of religion may be present yet at an early age.

"Religiosity and Life Satisfaction"

Adam Okulicz-Kozaryn, Harvard U.

Religiosity and Life Satisfaction A Multilevel Investigation Across Nations In this paper I investigate the relationship between religiosity and life satisfaction in 79 nations using World Values Survey data. To solve methodological problems evident in previous work a random coefficient multilevel model is employed to account for the fact that individuals are nested within countries. Preliminary results indicate that religious people are happier in religious nations. In other words, it is not only religiosity per se that makes people happy but also social setting.

SESSION 5B: Discrimination: From "Faiths" to Favoritism

Convener/Discussant: Wafa Hakim Orman, U. Alabama in Huntsville

"Caste-Based Discrimination: Evidence and Policy"
Zahra Siddique, Institute for the Study of Labor (Germany)

Caste-based quotas in hiring have existed in the public sector in India for decades, and there has been recent debate about the introduction of such quotas in private sector jobs. This paper uses an audit study to determine the existence and extent of caste-based discrimination in the Indian private sector. Resumes with caste-specific names are sent to employers for entry-level jobs in the white-collar sector and the callback rates measured. On average, high-caste applicants need to send 6.2 resumes to get one callback while low-caste applicants need to send 7.4 resumes to get one callback, a difference of approximately 20%. This callback gap between high and low-caste applicants is shown to depend on both recruiter and firm characteristics. Differences in callback which favor high-caste applicants are particularly large when hiring is done by male recruiters or by Hindu recruiters. This finding suggests that the differences in callback between high and low-caste applicants are not entirely due to statistical discrimination. High-caste applicants are also differentially favored by firms with a smaller scale of operations (measured as the absence of foreign or multiple domestic offices/subsidiaries), while low-caste applicants are favored by firms with a larger scale of operations. This finding is consistent with taste-based theories of discrimination and with commitments made by large firms to hire actively from among low-caste groups. Keywords: Field Experiments, Discrimination, Public Policy, Human Resources

"On The Receiving End: Which Non-Believers Experience Discrimination or Prejudice?"

Ryan T. Cragun, U. Tampa

Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann (2006) noted that atheists are the most disliked group in the US today. However, no prior research has examined the experiences of those on the receiving end of this prejudice. Using the 2008 wave of the ARIS, I examine the non-believing individuals who have experienced prejudice or discrimination as a result of their lack of belief. I use demographic variables to determine regional, age, and socioeconomic variation in experienced

prejudice and find that prejudice towards non-believers is predictable given specific characteristics.

"Does the Leader's Ethnicity Matter? Ethnic Favoritism, Education and Health in Sub-Saharan Africa"

Ilia Rainer, George Mason U.

This paper provides a new assessment of ethnic favoritism in Sub-Saharan Africa. Using data from 18 African countries, we study how primary education and infant mortality of ethnic groups were affected by changes in the ethnicity of the countries' leaders during the last fifty years. Our results indicate that the effects of ethnic favoritism in Africa are substantial and provide support for the ethnicity-based explanations of African underdevelopment. We also find that ethnic favoritism is more prevalent in countries where governments have greater fiscal resources and is less prevalent in countries with one dominant religion. In contrast, countries whose ethnic groups speak structurally unrelated languages or live in more segregated areas do not display higher levels of ethnic favoritism.

SESSION 5C: TheARDA.com: Religious Data and Much, Much More

Convener/Discussant: Roger Finke, Penn State U.

"An Overview of Existing and Proposed Services"

Roger Finke, Penn State U.

TBA

"The Learning Center: Developing new Teaching Tools and Resources"

Chris Scheitle, Penn State U.

TBA

"The Research Hub: Developing the Best Practices Center"

Paul Froese, Baylor U.

TBA

"The Research Hub: Developing the Online Question Lab"

Chris Bader, Baylor U.

TBA

SESSION 5D: Mega-Churches, Para-Churches, Growing Churches

Convener/Discussant: Stonebraker Robert, Winthrop College

"The View from the Comfy Padded Pew: New Data on Megachurch Attendees"

Scott Thumma, Hartford Institute for Religion Research

TBA

"Congregational Economies of Scale and the Megachurch: An Application of the Stigler Survivor Technique"

Kenneth Elzinga, U. Virginia
Colin Page

This paper explores the economic determinants and current trends of church congregational size and organization. More

specifically, we utilize Stigler's survivor technique in order to estimate optimal church size and economies of scale with respect to several Christian denominations: the Presbyterian Church U.S.A., the United Methodist Church, the Episcopal Church, and the Church of the Nazarene. According to Stigler's logic, if firms of a particular size gain in market share over time, the economic inference is that those firms are exploiting economies of scale. Conversely, those firms that decline in market share over time must be suffering from diseconomies of scale. Extending Stigler's logic to the religious marketplace sheds light on current trends in the American religious community, such as the rise of the "megachurch" in recent decades and the simultaneous decline in church membership and attendance across most mainline denominations.

"Utility of Social Contact Facilitation as a Predictor of Church Growth"

Brett Kosterman, U. Amsterdam

The article builds on current research dealing with church growth within the market of religious communities. Proposing that desire for social contact is a main commodity found in growing congregations, we should find that congregations offering services that facilitate social contact will have higher rates of growth. Drawing from research in the field of social psychology, variables for facilitation of social contact found within the 2001 US Congregational Life Surveys for Southern Baptist and Presbyterian congregation profiles are measured for correlation with higher levels of growth in comparison to growth levels for congregations with lower levels social contact facilitation activities.

"The Rise, Fall and Rise Again of the Parachurch Sector"

Chris Scheitle, Penn State U.

TBA

SATURDAY, 10:15 - 11:45 AM

SESSION 6A: International Perspectives on Religion and Schooling

Convener/Discussant: S. Ramachandran, The World Bank

"Religion or region? Social divisions in school participation and attainment in India"

Florencia Lopez-Boo, Inter-American Development Bank
M. N. Asadullah, U. Reading (UK)
Uma Kambhampati, U. Reading (UK)

This study documents the size and nature of Hindu-Muslim gaps in school participation and attainments in India drawing upon several rounds of National Sample Survey (NSS) data. Even after controlling for socio-economic conditions and parental background, Muslim children were found to be significantly disadvantaged in terms of school enrolment and grade completion in 1983. By 2004, whilst these gaps have been narrowed, significant gaps remain, particularly in grade completion. We consider a specific hypothesis to explain these educational disparities between children of India's two largest religious groups – influence of state of residence. Child schooling regressions yield large coefficients on state dummies even after controlling religious membership and observed differences in socio-economic and family conditions of the child. Therefore, we explore the extent to which the observed Muslim disadvantage in India can be attributed to region of residence and the socio-economic

and political characteristics of that region. We conclude that whilst state matters, it is not related in a simple way to specific characteristics. Key words: Demand for education, religion, India

"Christian Missionary Flows and Economic Growth"

William Clark, U. of Michigan

The causal effects of Catholic schooling on student outcomes have proven challenging to estimate, with several previous studies using the proportion of a geographic unit's population which is Catholic as a potentially exogenous source of variation in the availability of Catholic high schools. We propose a new approach which instead relies on the historical distribution of religious preferences. Specifically, we find that county-level Catholic shares measured at the end of the nineteenth century are far more strongly associated with Catholic school attendance than are current Catholic shares. Using several strategies, we show that historical Catholic shares are likely to be exogenous to student outcomes conditional on the current distribution of religion. Estimates based on this identification strategy point to smaller Catholic schooling effects than those implied by OLS, in contrast to instrumental variables estimates from previous studies. Keywords: Private, Public, Catholic, treatment effect

"Harnessing the Power: Islam and Development Action in Africa"

Simon Fass, U. Texas at Dallas

Demand for public schooling is generally low where economic growth or emigration prospects are limited. In rural Africa, for instance, parents often see little gain because near and distant markets for knowledge supplied by these schools are not evident. Clearer are opportunity costs. Time in school is time out from on-the-job acquisition of occupational skills, such as herding and farming, and socio-cultural skills, such as reciprocity and intergenerational obligation. To the extent that it is secular - where secularity registers as a faith alien to those who adhere to named religions - a school can threaten family and community cohesion, and so also survival. Cultivating demand in such milieus calls for approaches different from those in common use elsewhere. Required to raise perceived benefits are educational forms that aim to improve knowledge sets that parents already value. Required to lower perceived costs is de-secularization. Adapting premises of Massachusetts' compulsory education law of 1647 (i.e., literacy is the path to God's Biblical word), in 1993 the Swiss Development Cooperation agency launched an experiment in Chad to see whether schools emphasizing improvement in Islamic knowledge and practice could elicit positive responses from nomadic parents. In the event, demand for schooling girls and boys exploded. Enrollment expanded from nothing to several thousand in a short time, and initial parental interest in religion soon widened to embrace numeracy, French literacy and science. Among other things, the experiment underscores the power of faith to both block and facilitate progress through its influence on consumer demand. It also suggests that faith is itself neutral. The vital aspect is recognition of its power and design of methods to harness it.

"Faith-Based Schools in Conflict-affected Countries: Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo"

Quentin T. Wodon, The World Bank

It is often argued that faith-based organizations (FBOs) provide a substantial share of education, health and other social services in African countries, especially in post-conflict countries where state capacity infrastructure is weak. It is also often argued that the services provided by FBOs tend to be better targeted to the poor than is the case for other private service providers and perhaps even for public providers. If both assertions are correct, they may have implications for policy, as donors as well as possibly governments may then be more inclined to support FBOs in their service delivery activities. This paper uses recent and nationally representative household survey data to compare the coverage, targeting, and performance of faith-based and public schools in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The results suggest that in Sierra Leone, faith-based schools reach the poor more than public schools, and also perform slightly better after controlling for the characteristics of the student body. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, there are few differences in the types of students reached by faith-based and public schools, and while there is some indication that faith-based schools might perform slightly better, those results cannot be considered as statistically significant.

SESSION 6B: Violence

Convener/Discussant: Denise Baken, George Mason U.

"Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq"

Eli Berman, UCSD

Don't have a paper to present on religion per se. I'd like to present on violence in Iraq, which does have a strong religious aspect and is related to service provision.

"Wars and Rumors of Wars: Explaining Religiously Motivated Violence"

Roger Finke, Penn State U.

Jaime Harris, Penn State U.

Wars and Rumors of Wars: Explaining Religiously Motivated Violence When it comes to religion, the ties that bind also sever. Observers have long recognized the capacity of religion to both integrate and segregate, to serve as the opium as well as the amphetamines of social change. This paper strives to understand the sources of religiously motivated violence. Using cross-national measures from the ARDA's coding of the U.S. State Department's International Religious Freedom Reports and Jonathan Fox's Religion and State data collection, we will identify the political and social forces that serve to motivate religious violence. In particular, we will look at how these forces physically and socially segregate religious communities, how they increase grievances through regulation and discrimination of religions, and how religious communities are mobilized to action through overlapping ethnic, political and social movement ties. We propose that segregation, discrimination, and opportunities for mobilization will all contribute to increased levels of religious violence.

"Combating Terrorists: A Model of Religion, Suicide Bomber Recruitment, and Interventions"

Michael McBride, U. of California-Irvine

Gary Richardson, U. of California - Irvine

TBA

SESSION 6C: Family

Convener/Discussant: Derek Yonai, Campbell U.

"Early Marriage and Homogamy: Evidence from Chinese Minorities"

Li Han, Stanford U
Tao Li

Early Marriage and Homogamy: Evidence from Chinese Minorities This paper studies early marriage as a tool to increase homogamy rates among minorities. We pay particular attention to Hui Chinese Muslims. As minority communities, China's Muslims have survived for about 1400 years, most often in rather inhospitable circumstances. An important mechanism for preserving the group identity is through homogamy. The homogamy rate remains high even when economic perspectives of non-Muslim marriage markets increase. This paper presents an analysis from the community's perspective. As the pressure from outside increases, communities tend to make more effort to improve the efficiency of the internal marriage market. One example is that parents are likely to arrange early marriages for children. The preliminary empirical evidence drawn from census is consistent with the model prediction.

"A new theory of mixed marriage"

David Voas, U. Manchester

Of all the characteristics commonly studied, race and religion are the ones most likely to match in married and cohabiting couples. There are wide variations in the extent of homogamy, however, from one place and period to another and as a function of the religious or ethnic groups involved. Theories of mixed marriage based on social exchange or household production are well known but also much criticised. This paper offers a new theory of mixed partnership based on the value attached to religious or ethnic capital, the perceived importance of group membership for maintaining and transmitting it, the investment in the relationship, and the perceived riskiness of out-marriage. Statistics from the 2001 census of population in England and Wales are used both to test the theory and to investigate the extent of religious mixing among married and cohabiting couples. Non-marital cohabitation and mixed marriages are infrequent in the Hindu, Sikh and Muslim groups; they are common among the black and especially the mixed ethnicity subpopulations.

"Mom and Dad Took Me to Church"

Wafa Hakim Orman, U. Alabama in Huntsville
Charles North, Baylor U.
Carl Gwin, Pepperdine U.

We look at data from the two waves of the Baylor Survey taken in the spring of 2005 and the fall of 2006, and from the NLSY79 Child/Young Adult Survey to see whether people really do start going to church when they have kids, and what difference it makes in their kids' lives. Preliminary results show that parents are a lot more likely to go to church than people with no children; and better-educated people generally had parents who attended church services twice a month or more. We also find that the education effects are not the same for men and women. Parents' religious attendance has a much bigger impact on women than on men. For men, there is no consistent relationship between either parent's church attendance and the amount of education ultimately achieved. For women, there is a

clear positive relationship, at least up to the point of attending weekly.

SESSION 6D: Media Roundtable: Telling your Story to Journalists, Broadcasters, and Bloggers

Convener/Discussant: Arthur Brooks, American Enterprise Institute

- Peter Coy, Economics Editor, BusinessWeek
- Richard Cimino, Religion Watch
- Larry S. Witham
- Cathy Grossman, USA Today
- Ariela Keysar, Trinity College

SATURDAY, 1:15 - 2:45 PM

SESSION 7A: Faith and Philanthropy

Convener/Discussant: Robert Mochrie, Heriot-Watt U.

"Tough Love, Intergenerational Altruism, and Worldviews"

Masao Ogaki, The Ohio State U.
Vipul Bhatt, Ohio State U.

We investigate whether and how worldviews affect altruistic economic behavior of individuals within and across families. The standard economic model assumes that all agents share the same world view of Naturalism, in which it is believed that there exist no after-lives and no spiritual beings who may reward altruistic behavior. In reality, people have different worldviews. For example, many people in the United States state that they believe that heaven and hell exist. It is also likely that some people are attaching positive probabilities to different worldviews, because they are not perfectly sure. Different probabilities attached to different worldviews can affect altruistic economic behavior. For example, in worldviews in which after-lives exist, it is typically believed that altruistic economic behavior toward poor people has desirable effects in after-life. It may either increase the probability that he gets into heaven, or increase his rewards in heaven. Hence, he has incentives to behave altruistically toward poor people. We use survey data collected from church attendants in Japan about worldviews and altruistic economic behavior and also Osaka University Center of Excellence data for U.S. and Japan to investigate predictions of how different worldviews affect altruistic behavior.

"A Theory of Congregational Giving"

Jonathan Rosborough, U. Western Ontario

This paper builds on the economic model of voluntary contributions to a public good to explain a broad range of empirical regularities in giving and attendance patterns in religious congregations. We provide theoretical predictions about these patterns, both across individuals within a congregation, and across congregations with different institutional features. The model treats the religious service collectively consumed by the congregation as a "participatory" public good, in the sense that while its public value is positively affected by contributions, consumption by members is allowed to vary by the amount of time they devote towards attendance. When potential members are heterogeneous with respect to income and tastes for the religious service, the model predicts that lower income individuals will be over-represented in religious congregations, with giving concentrated among higher

income members. Across congregations we compare behavior in "exclusive" congregations (those that appeal strongly to a narrow set of individual beliefs) with "inclusive" congregations (those that appeal to a broader set of beliefs). The model predicts that inclusive congregations will have larger memberships with giving primarily coming from those with the highest income levels, while exclusive congregations will have higher average giving and attendance rates with a lower average income among contributors. Moreover, when congregations require that individuals "tithe" a small percentage of their income to gain membership, the model predicts that while membership may decrease, total giving will be higher.

"Correlates of overseas giving by us congregations"

David Sikkink, Notre Dame U.

What explains the overseas giving patterns of US congregations? Using data from the 2007 Notre Dame Congregational Survey, this paper estimates that US congregations donated \$7 billion to overseas relief and development efforts in 2006. About 56 percent of congregations gave money through US-based relief and development organizations, and 33 percent gave money directly to programs and organizations in foreign countries. This paper investigates the correlates of total donations and of the form of overseas giving (e.g., US-based organizations versus direct giving). It argues that evangelical Protestant congregations give less to overseas relief and development, in part because they tend not to work through US relief and development organizations, but instead donate directly to programs and organizations in foreign countries. The findings reveal that mainline Protestant congregations provide more donations than evangelical Protestant congregations, net of important demographic factors, but other religious traditions are very similar to evangelical Protestantism on overseas giving amounts. While not finding any differences based on political orientations of the congregation, the findings show that politically and civically active congregations are more likely to donate money to overseas relief and development. The paper also discusses important demographic effects at the congregational level, including age structure (e.g., predominately older and predominately younger are less likely to be involved), and racial and ethnic distribution (e.g., Latino congregations tend to give more, but African American congregations tend to give less).

SESSION 7B: Terrorism

Convener/Discussant: Gary Shiffman, Georgetown U.

"Network Topography, Key Players and Terrorist Networks"

Sean Everton, Naval Postgraduate School

In recent years social network analysis (SNA) has enhanced our understanding of how terrorist networks organize themselves and offered potential strategies for their disruption. To date, however, SNA research of terrorist networks has tended to focus on key actors within the network who score high in terms of centrality or whose structural location (i.e., their location within the overall network) allows them to broker information and/or resources within the network. However, while this focus may be intuitively appealing and could provide short-term satisfaction, it may be putting the cart before the horse. What I would like to suggest (and argue in this paper) is that before jumping to the identification of key actors, we need to

first explore the overall topography of the network. Research into the topographical characteristics of other networks suggests that networks that are too provincial (e.g., dense, high levels of clustering, an overabundance of strong ties) or too cosmopolitan (e.g., sparse, low levels of clustering, an overabundance of weak ties) tend not to perform as well as those that maintain an optimum balance between the two extremes. If this dynamic also holds true for terrorist networks, then while the key player approach may be appropriate in some circumstances, it may lead to deleterious results in others.

"Suicidal Terrorism and Benevolent Alternatives: A Model of Economics and Religion"

Ronald Horst, U. Maryland

We construct an economic model of the religious terrorist who chooses between suicidal attack and benevolent alternatives. Rather than to assume fanaticism, we assume that behavior is guided by rational assessment of expected rewards for community and for self, both in the present world and in the afterlife. We employ the (after) life-cycle model of consumption and savings that allows accumulation of religious capital by sacrificing economic resources, and where religious capital yields expected rewards in the afterlife. We incorporate beliefs that suicidal attacks may contribute to religious capital. In this way, we consider the anticipation of reward and punishment in the afterlife as a motivation for sacrifice in the present world. The model is configured to reflect several traditions of religious and nonreligious terrorism, and optimal behavior is derived for each. The results suggest policy responses to lessen the appeal of terrorism relative to benevolent alternatives, and we determine the conditions under which such policies might prove effective.

"An Examination of the Return on Investment Islamic Economics Provides the Terrorism Industry"

Denise Baken, George Mason U.

Through the social fabric of network relationships, Osama bin Laden skillfully guided al Qaeda to the stature of an international Fortune 500 corporation. Using the intangibles of trust, mission dedication, training, familial preference and allegiance, bin Laden exploited the orthodox of his core market and extended al Qaeda's outreach to all followers of Islam. Steeping al Qaeda in Islam created a social fabric that was easily recognizable by all followers of Islam. Adhering to the three tenets of Islam (unity, distributional equity and work and productivity) resulted in a unified following, eliminated opportunistic behavior and expanded investor opportunities. These same tenets also frame Islamic economics and bin Laden's incorporation of them into his business plan was innovative for the terrorism industry of 1989. It created a framework for estimating potential terror mission's value. The function incorporates the non-quantitatives of religion and religious economics to determine an activity's value to the organization's overall focus. When these tenets and intangibles (trust, mission dedication, training, familial preference and allegiance) are incorporated into the non-quantitative influences of Islam, a means to deduce a balanced scorecard value for al Qaeda missions or other activities is created. This value $[V_m = f(c, t, m, q - mc)]$ reflects the relationship between the cost of an al Qaeda mission, all time associated with its successful execution, and its quality and functionality. The result is then raised to the power (influence) of Islam, giving the

intelligence and its subsequent data analysis a return on investment corollary structure. Employing this business/ROI rubric permits national security and public health officials to assess credible reports of terrorist activity, dual-use technology exploitation or emerging disease creation for significant consequences and/or viability.

SESSION 7C: Church and Sect

Convener/Discussant: Ryan T. Cragun, U. Tampa

"TFP and the Heralds of The Gospel: The Religious Economy of Brazilian Conservative Catholicism"

Massimo Introvigne, Center for Studies on New Religions

Established in 1960 by Brazilian academic and political activist Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira the Brazilian Society for the Defense of Tradition Family and Property (TFP) was the largest and most well-known (although controversial) conservative Catholic organization in Brazil for thirty-five years, and generated sister organizations in several American and European countries. After the founder's death in 1995, a bitter litigation (not yet concluded) opposed two groups of members. One kept the style and politics of the original TFP with the name Association of the Founders, while the largest group won the legal right to use the name TFP (in Brazil, although not in the U.S., where the name belongs to an association loyal to the Founders) and went on to establish the more moderate Heralds of the Gospel, recognized by the Vatican in 2001 and very successful both in Brazil and abroad. The paper argues that the success and trials of the TFP and the Heralds of the Gospel are best explained by considering the Brazilian religious market, both in its interbrand (with the crisis of Roman Catholicism and the rise of Pentecostalism) and intrabrand dimensions. While the TFP found followers within the "strict" niche of Brazilian Catholicism, which had been virtually abandoned by more mainline Catholic organizations in the heydays of liberation theology, the Heralds of the Gospel by seeking to penetrate the central niche of the interbrand Brazilian Catholic religious market have achieved an ever greater success.

"Why socialism fails but monasticism works"

Nathan Smith, George Mason U.

It has become a truism that "communism doesn't work," in the wake of the failure, not only of the Soviet Union and its bloc, but also of many communal ventures, from Brooks Farm to the Israeli kibbutzim (some of which still exist but have retreated from many of their socialistic ambitions). Yet monasteries, which were based on some of the same principles-- communal living, abdication of private property-- have flourished for many centuries, and for several medieval centuries were arguably the backbone of civilization. This paper explains both the failure of socialism and the success of monasticism through a simple economic model which treats individuals as utility maximizers, with worship and spiritual capital in the utility function. The model can illuminate an economically important historical episode, and may have implications for understanding other purpose-driven voluntary organizations, such as modern NGOs.

"Unitarian Growth-Contesting the Church to Sect Hypothesis"

Larry S. Landrum, Virginia Western Community College

The Unitarian Universalist Association is the most liberal mainstream denomination in the country, so liberal it is

sometimes not considered mainstream. It is growing in total numbers while nearly all the other mainstream denominations are shrinking. Stark and Finke (1994) assert that this is due to the UUA moving away from its ultra-liberal stance to a somewhat more moderate one. This paper presents and tests an alternative hypothesis: The UUA is growing because of expansion in areas where it traditionally has been almost non-existent, filling an otherwise nearly unserved ultra-liberal niche, a sect to church movement. These newer congregations have grown exponentially since a wave of new starts occurred in the 1950s and their continued moderate grow is now generating absolute increases exceeding the decline occurring in Unitarian Universalism's traditional base of New England and the Midwest. If Unitarian Universalism were moving towards sect status this regional decline would seem unlikely. Methodology will be regression and other statistical comparisons of New England districts with those outside New England with and without controls for census variables such as population change, education levels, etc.

"Formalized Paganism: A Test of the Church-Sect Transition"

Emily Stevenson, Penn State U.
Benjamin McKune, Penn State U.
Stephen Merino, Penn State U.

Neopaganism is an umbrella term for a diverse group of modern religious movements. Styles of practice and beliefs vary widely. The Ár nDraíocht Féin (ADF) is a neo-druid organization with official nonprofit, tax-exempt status in the United States. It represents one of the most formal religious organizations within neopaganism. With around 1,100 members, the ADF constitutes one of the largest Neopagan organizations in the world. Until recently, a large scale, quantitative study of a Neopagan organization has been problematic due to the lack of a centralized infrastructure, incomplete or nonexistent membership lists, and the tendency of Neopagans (and marginalized religious groups in general) to be less open with survey researchers about their beliefs. We seek to understand the impact of formal organization on neopagan belief and practice. The ADF is particularly unique in its goal to develop a professional clergy and become a mainstream organization. This study will examine the process by which neopagan practice and belief becomes standardized and institutionalized in a formal religious organization and what impact this has on the practice of neopaganism and its practitioners. In a sense, we seek to understand how a religious movement coalesces into a formal religious organization.

SESSION 7D: ERel Ed: Teaching the Economics of Religion

Convener/Discussant: Derek Yonai, Campbell U.

"ERel for the Masses: A Lecture-Based Introduction to the Economics of Religion"

Michael McBride, U. California at Irvine

TBA

"Team-Teaching the Economics and Sociology of Religion"

Michael Makowsky, Towson U.
Christine Brickman Bhutta, Catholic U. of America

TBA

"An Upper-Division ERel Seminar"

Joseph Daniels, Marquette U.

TBA

"Enhancing Standard Courses with ERel Applications"

Stonebraker Robert, Winthrop College

TBA

SATURDAY, 3:00 - 4:30 PM

SESSION 8A: Secularization

Convener/Discussant: David Voas, U. Manchester

"Economic Development and Religiosity: A Religious Capital Approach to Secularity Theories Rebuttal"

Sergio Figueroa, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México

Secularization theories have been popular for decades. Many scholars seem to agree that religion's role in modern society has dissolved to the point of being irrelevant or simply incompatible with economic development. Recent research, on the other hand, has found evidence that suggests the contrary. This paper attempts to provide for an explanation to such disparity, arguing that both perspectives are partially accurate since religiosity behaves as a quadratic function of economic development—defined in terms of investment in religious capital and its opportunity cost. Although data availability makes it difficult for the hypothesis to be categorically proven or disregarded, preliminary evidence based on the United Nations' Human Development Index database and the World Values Survey is reviewed to support the idea that societies in early development stages, just as societies in very high development stages, show high levels of religiosity, while societies in mid to high development stages show depressed levels of religiosity. The argument can't be indiscriminately translated to religiosity trends within a single society over time, but the idea is luring. If the hypothesis is correct, secularization theories' ability to predict religiosity in the long run is faint and their explanatory value is limited to a very specific stage in societies' development process.

"The decrease in religiosity in the twentieth century"

Raphael Franck, Bar-Ilan U.

Laurence Iannaccone, George Mason U.

TBA

"The Effects of Religious Regulation and Existential Security: A Cross-National Analysis"

Jaime Harris, Penn State U.

Scholars have developed various theoretical explanations concerning the determinants of religious participation and belief. Secularization theories arguing that religious involvement declines as societies modernize have enjoyed an unusually protracted and relatively unquestioned authority for decades; however, recent studies have challenged the primary tenets of the secularization doctrine and numerous technical criticisms and refinements have been offered by both secularization supporters and opponents. This research addresses challenges raised by proponents of religious economy models and attempts to conduct an empirical test of the core tenets of three competing perspectives: classic secularization, existential security, and religious economy models. I examine the

theorized negative relationship between modernization and religious involvement maintained by various secularization theories. Conventional modernization indicators are tested against supply-side predictors. Second, I examine the predictive power of measures of religious supply and demand. Proponents of religious economy models place emphasis on religious supply as an explanation of variation in religious involvement rather than on demand, but this analysis finds that both are useful in predicting variation. Further, I argue that specific forms of religious regulation have different effects on religious involvement, and these distinctions are important in refining religious economy models.

"For whom the bell tolls: Changing patterns of religious faith and practice in Ireland, 1981 -2008"

Michael J. Breen, U. of Limrick (Ireland)

This paper draws on four waves of the European Values Study (1981, 1990, 1999 and 2008). The European Values Study is a large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal survey research program on basic human values which takes place every nine years. It is clear that, across Europe, a profound transformation of modern culture is taking place, although not at the same speed in all countries. Cultural and social changes appear dependent upon the stage of socio-economic development and historical factors specific to a given nation. This paper presents an analysis of the survey data from Ireland, focusing on religious questions such as frequency of religious practice, sense of God, self-identification as religious, and a variety of religious and spiritual measures but in a context of sociological and theological reflection. Initial findings concern: religious denomination, religious practice, importance of religion, traditional beliefs, and faith in the church.

SESSION 8B: Church and State

Convener/Discussant: Charles North, Baylor U.

"Church and State"

Metin Cosgel, U. Connecticut

Thomas Miceli, U. Connecticut

Church and state have historically had an uneasy relationship, at times being close allies, at others harsh adversaries, and at still others largely independent. This paper develops a model of this relationship, where the state's objective is to maximize net tax revenue, while the church provides religious goods. Religious goods benefit the state in two ways: first, they provide utility to citizens, thus allowing the state to extract more taxes before running up against citizens' reservation utility (the point at which they would revolt), and second, they potentially provide legitimacy to the state, thereby lowering the costs of tax collection. If the latter effect is strong enough, the state may find it optimal to take control of the church, either to enhance its legitimizing effect, or to suppress its de-legitimizing effect. To evaluate the model's implications, we use recent cross-country data on the relationship between religion and state, including measures coded from the 2001, 2003, and 2005 International Religious Freedom reports. We also examine in more detail some of the paradigmatic cases indicated by the model, presenting various types of evidence from current and historical examples of each case.

"The Economics of the Scottish Disruption: Established Church Reaction to Market Entry"

John Sawkins, Heriot-Watt U.
Robert Mochrie, Heriot-Watt U.

The Economics of the Scottish Disruption: Established Church Reaction to Market Entry John W Sawkins and Robert I Mochrie July 2008 Abstract for ASREC Annual Meeting 3-5 April 2009 Abstract In May 1843 the 'established' Church of Scotland split over the question of the sovereignty of the church in civil matters. For thirty years, following this 'Disruption', religious denominations in Scotland engaged in intense competition for members and dominance of local markets. In analysing the emergence and development of competing denominations and their strategic interactions, this paper challenges the neoclassical 'economics of religion' approach by highlighting the importance of the particular framework of social values within which the civil and ecclesiastical authorities operated: 'establishment' in which church and state cooperate as partners in the provision of public services. Acknowledgement The authors acknowledge and thank the British Academy for financial support received. All errors are the responsibility of the authors. Affiliation of Authors Dr John W Sawkins (corresponding author) j.w.sawkins@hw.ac.uk Dr Robert I Mochrie r.i.mochrie@hw.ac.uk Department of Economics School of Management and Languages Heriot-Watt University Edinburgh EH14 4AS UK Tel: 44 131 451 3611

"State Church or Public Good? The 'Establishment Principle' in Thomas Chalmers' Thought."

Robert Mochrie, Heriot-Watt U.

Within the economics of religion, it is sometimes argued that a state church, which enjoys legal privileges, depresses participation in the market for religion. This paper reviews the counter-argument presented by the nineteenth century Scottish divine, Thomas Chalmers, that market failures in secular and religious education depress demand, so that public support given to both educational and religious institutions would lead to higher participation. The paper details the mechanisms that Chalmers proposed to ensure effective governance of such institutions, in particular the separation of the secular and spiritual spheres of government. It then analyses Chalmers' success in devising new funding mechanisms that enabled firstly the Church of Scotland, and subsequently the Free Church of Scotland, to meet the challenges of rapid population growth in the emerging industrial centres of nineteenth century Scotland, concluding that the relative success of the state church in maintaining market share in the face of entry is consistent with the presence of network externalities derived from its universal service obligation.

"Church-state separation and redistribution"

John Huber, Columbia
Piero Stanig, New York U.

We analyze how financial separation of church and state should influence redistribution. The formal model we develop describes how incentives for charitable giving, coupled with church-state institutions, create opportunities for the rich to form coalitions with the religious poor, at the expense of the secular poor. Religion can limit redistribution, not because of the particular faith, belief or risk attitudes of religious individuals, but rather because of material considerations among the rich and the religious poor. The model also suggests that as church-state separation

increases, government redistribution should decline. Empirical tests support this argument.

SESSION 8C: Together At Last: The Mormons and the Amish

Convener/Discussant: Paul Olson, Briar Cliff U.

"Why Mormons Defy the Logic of the Market Share Thesis: An Ethnographic Inquiry"

Rick Phillips, U. North Florida

A substantial body of literature finds that when religious groups have a small share of a given religious market they exhibit higher levels of religious activity. However, patterns of religious participation among members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the LDS, or Mormon, church) defy this logic. Abundant evidence demonstrates that Mormons have higher rates of religious activity where they predominate. This paper uses ethnographic analysis to demonstrate that the pervasive standardization of the LDS organization limits "supply-side" variation in the Mormon "product" across ecological units. The paper then turns to how the unique conflation of important social structures in Mormon enclaves produces a religious culture that inflates church activity well beyond the level predicted by the church's formal efforts to elicit religious behavior. The paper closes by arguing that qualitative inquiry highlights certain problems with the corpus of quantitative studies that investigate the market share thesis, and offers solutions to ameliorate these.

"What's love got to do with it?" Doctrinal economy and the subversion of love in Mormon polygamy"

Carrie Miles, George Mason U.

Around 1800, one of the "big questions" within the Christian world was whether one married for love or money. By the middle of the 19th century, however, marriage based on love was firmly established as the ideal. By the 20th, the idea of marrying for money was regarded as repugnant. Polygamy, which according to Gary Becker is made possible solely by materialistic concerns, was inconceivable in Victorian culture. During this same time period, however, Mormons announced the doctrine of "celestial" marriage or polygamy -- a concept of marriage that had nothing to do with either love or money. This doctrine was widely practiced by the mainstream Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in the 19th century and continues to be honored among contemporary Mormon fundamentalists. Using Becker's model, I show how a practice that is "irrational" from a financial and cultural point of view can nonetheless be rational (or rationalized) from a religious one.

"Transition to Adulthood Among the Old Order Amish of Holmes County"

Benjamin McKune, Penn State U.

While several ethnographic reports have documented the transition from youth to adulthood in individual Amish communities, there has yet to be a large-scale, qualitative analysis of the transition to adulthood among Amish Youth. However, many Amish settlements keep detailed records of their youth including their birthdates, marriages, vocations, family situations, parental occupations and migration patterns and publish them in commercially available directories. The data for this study comes from a series of

Amish directories published in 1965, 1973, 1981, 1988, 1996 and 2000 that include most Older Order Amish families and communities living in the Greater Holmes County Area of Ohio, which includes roughly 1/6th of all Amish adherents living in North America. In making the transition to adulthood, Amish youth are faced five main options which are 1) remaining within their home-community and establishing an independent family farm 2) remaining within their community of origin and adopting a non-traditional vocation (such as construction work or factory labor) 3) migrating to a new settlement and establishing a family farm, 4) migrating to another settlement and engaging in non-traditional work and 5) leaving (or apostatizing from) the Old Order Amish faith entirely. Our study will track several birth cohorts and use multinomial logistic regression to determine the probability that Amish youth will adopt each of the five aforementioned lifestyles. We will also see how the probability of accepting each lifestyle varies according to 1) occupation of parents 2) total number of siblings 3) gender composition of siblings 4) population density.

"The Effects of Education on the Amish"

Liang Wang, U. California, San Diego

The Amish prohibit high school education. Given the positive returns to education, the Amish objection to high school education can be costly. The 1972 United States Supreme Court ruling in Wisconsin v. Yoder that exempts the Amish from compulsory schooling laws beyond the eighth grade provides a natural experiment to study the causal effects of education on their earnings. My findings indicate that (exempted) Amish cohorts reaching age 14 immediately after the court ruling in 1972 were 8 to 25 percent more likely to drop out of school upon completing the eighth grade than older Amish cohorts. The exemption resulted in a 10 to 11-month decrease in average completed schooling. Instrumental variable estimates show that the rate of returns for an additional year of schooling is between 19 to 21.5 percent. The high estimated value of schooling for the Amish raises the question of why the Amish choose to sacrifice earnings by not attending high school. The results invite an interpretation based on the religious club model (Iannaccone 1992) in which sacrificed schooling signals commitment. The religious club interpretation is consistent with two further findings: (1) by allowing early dropouts, the court ruling increased the likelihood of an Amish-born person leaving the sect by 11 to 20 percent; (2) Amish leavers have higher educational attainment and earnings than Amish members.

SESSION 8D: New Methods for Religious Research: Experiments and Cognitive Science

Convener/Discussant: Dan Houser, George Mason U.

"A Secular Mind"

Jonathan Lanman, U. Oxford

Cognitive anthropologists argue that we can better answer enduring anthropological questions by utilizing the growing insights of the cognitive and evolutionary sciences. This belief is not wholly unjustified, as cognitive anthropologists have had some success in addressing the long-standing question of why religious beliefs and practices are so widespread in human populations, mostly in reference to universal cognitive biases. This success, however, raises another enduring anthropological question, that of how to best account for "secularization." If religious beliefs are so well supported by universal cognitive biases, whence

secularization and atheism? In this presentation, I will argue that a cognitive approach can help answer one important element of the secularization debate, the question of whether or not particular socio-economic environments cause decreased levels of religious belief. I will present both qualitative and quantitative data from my fieldwork and survey research among non-theists in Western countries suggesting that particular socio-economic environments do indeed lower levels of religious belief and that this effect occurs through the impact of these environments on our coalitional and moral psychological systems.

"What Do Brains Have to Do With It? How Neuroscience Can Contribute to Understanding the Role of Religion in Society"

Margaret Polsky, George Mason U.

In *Wired for Survival: Rational (And Irrational) Choices from the Gas Pump to Terrorism* (September, 2008) I argue that our primary social values and institutions are codified not in contracts, law, government, culture, religion or other social belief systems, but in the neural networks embedded in our bodies and our brains. For centuries we have debated whether a better society depends upon better people or better belief systems, institutions, and organizations. This debate fueled the work of the 18th century Anglo-Scots moralists, whose work has influenced over 200 years of political and economic thought and policy-making. Yet today when social scientists think about moral choice and social regulation, we typically focus on discovering arrangements that are associated with ideal outcomes without considering the real capacities of the people who are the object of our interest. North (2005) argues that for societies to evolve, the minds of those in the society must evolve. But the scientific evidence suggests that can't change our minds or our societies without changing our brains: Social change requires remapping our individual selves, the way that we interact with others, and consequently, the way that we think and make choices. This essay summarizes what we know about the biological basis of human nature and develops implications for analyzing the role of religion in society.

"Trust and Social Capital in Immigrant Networks"

Wafa Hakim Orman, U. Alabama - Huntsville
James Cox, Georgia State U.

We examine the relative levels of bridging and bonding capital between first and second-generation Arab and Muslim Americans and native-born Americans at an individual level, and compare this with other immigrant communities. We use an experimental moonlighting game to study trust, positive, and negative reciprocity. The survey enables us to more precisely learn what develops the two forms of social capital. We can relate it to demographic characteristics, income, education, and life experiences, which may be shaped by exclusionary attitudes of the native population.

"Endogenous Group Formation through "Sacrificial" Costs"

Michael Makowsky, Towson U.
Jason Aimone, George Mason U.
Jared Rubin, Cal. State Fullerton
Laurence Iannaccone, George Mason U.

We have developed an experiment to test Iannaccone's (1992) claim that seemingly gratuitous "sacrifice and stigma"

functions to limit free-riding. Although the claim has influenced much of the recent research on religious and secular extremism, ours is the first attempt to test the sacrifice model in a laboratory setting. We start with a standard public goods experiment, and then modify it so as to permit the subjects to choose a rate of sacrifice to be levied upon themselves and the other endogenously selected members of their group (group selection is based on the level of sacrifice chosen). Results from our pilot study (with two 16-person sessions and multiple rounds) strongly support the basic theory. Sacrifice does appear to screen for commitment: subjects with higher unconditional contributions in round 1 were more likely to join higher sacrifice groups, when given the chance to do so in subsequent rounds. And sacrifice also induces substitution from private to group activity: subjects raised their average contributions after being allocated to high-sacrifice groups.

SATURDAY, 4:45 - 6:00 PM

SESSION 8P: Plenary Session - 2

Convener/Discussant: William Clark, U. of Michigan

"The Earthly Rewards to Faith, Hope, and Charity"

Arthur Brooks, American Enterprise Institute

TBA

SATURDAY, 6:00 - 7:00 PM: RECEPTION

SATURDAY, 9:00 - 11:00 PM: EVENING SOCIAL

SUNDAY, APRIL 5

SUNDAY, 8:30 - 10:00 AM

SESSION 9A: Causes and Consequences of Religious Liberty

Convener/Discussant: Michael McBride, U. of California-Irvine

"Variation of Religious Freedom in Central Asia: History, Differentiation, and Political Theology"

Joni Finegold, George Mason U.

While much research has been done on the various regimes of Eastern Europe and Central Asia as well as the impact of religious freedom or lack thereof as a broad issue (Grim and Finke, 2007), there is little comparison of regulation of religion and religious groups by these states after the fall of the Soviet Union. In the nearly twenty years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, a wide variation has developed in these governments' attitudes towards and regulation of religious matters. An examination of these differences will reveal the critical junctures in the development of government regulation of religion. This paper will examine states in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia, both Muslim and Christian dominant. Hypotheses to be considered include: the communist legacy of secularism, external influences on the nascent states, and outside funding and influence of Islamic nationalist movements. The findings should provide ideas on further promotion of religious freedom.

"The Bundled Commodity of Human Freedoms: Religious Freedom, an Element?"

Brian Grim, Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life

This paper extends Grim and Finke's (2007) argument that the restriction of religious freedom leads to violence; here, I empirically look at the positive contributions of religious freedom makes to other economic and social outcomes, including in the consolidation of other freedoms. There is empirical support for the proposition that religious freedom is an integral part of the bundled commodity of human freedoms. A growing body of research supports the proposition that the religious competition inherent in religious freedom results in increased religious participation; and religious participation in turn can lead to a wide range of positive social and political outcomes. An analysis of the Pew Forum's 2009 Restriction of Religion Index finds that wherever religious restriction is low and its corollary, religious freedom, is high, other basic freedoms – such as freedom of the press, political freedom and economic freedom – also tend to be high. Furthermore, where restrictions on religion are lower, there also tends to be fewer incidents of armed conflict, better health outcomes, higher levels of earned income, and better educational opportunities for women. In a globalized 21st century world where religion is resurgent, religious freedom may be a lynchpin in the bundled commodity of human freedoms.

"Religion, Corruption, and the Rule of Law"

Charles North, Baylor U.

Carl Gwin, Pepperdine U.

Wafa Hakim Orman, U. Alabama - Huntsville

The paper explores the connection between religion and two well-known factors affecting economic growth: the rule of law and corruption. We find that the strength of the rule of law and the level of corruption both depend on a country's religious heritage. In particular, we find that (1) countries whose largest religious group in 1900 was Protestantism, Catholicism, or Hinduism have a stronger rule of law in 2004 than countries whose largest religious group in 1900 was Islam, an African or Pacific Island ethnic religion, or Orthodox Christianity; (2) countries whose largest religious group in 2000 was an Asian ethnic religion have a stronger rule of law and lower corruption in 2004 than most other countries; and (3) countries whose largest religious group in 1900 was Protestantism have lower corruption in 2004. Differences in outcomes based on the largest religious group in 2000 versus 1900 are attributable mainly to widespread 20th century conversion to Catholicism, Protestantism, and Islam in Africa and the Pacific Island nations.

"Differentiated Trust in Democratic Institutions according to Level of Government Favoritism and Regulation"

Kristin Smith, U. of Washington

Studies have shown religious organizations to be among the most trusted institutions of civil society in Europe. Similarly, research has shown that, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, church organizations boast far higher levels of trust than government organizations or non-religious civil society institutions. In this study, the link between religion and trust in democratic institutions among individuals is explored in relation to the size of the largest religious group in twenty-one European countries. Based on the European Social Survey (Round II, 2004) and using multi-level modeling it is concluded that the larger the size of the largest religious

group, the lower the level of trust in democratic institutions among religious minorities. This finding supports hypothesis that the larger the size of the largest religious group, the more likely the minorities are to fear that the government is dominated by the largest religious group and their interests are not represented. For the version to be presented at ASREC I intend to add variables gauging the effect of government favoritism and regulation of religion using measures from the ARDA database to the model. My main hypothesis is that trust in democratic institutions among the members of religious minorities will fall as favoritism and regulation increase as those groups are further alienated from the democratic process. Furthermore, I hypothesize that countries with high levels of government regulation/favoritism will exhibit overall lower levels of trust in democratic institutions than those with low levels of regulation/favoritism even when controlling for a large majority. Religious pluralism and low levels of regulation will be shown to be important not only to the religious market, but to a healthy democratic system in Europe.

SESSION 9B: Religion and Politics

Convener/Discussant: William Clark, U. of Michigan

"A Game Theoretic Approach to Inter-Religious Coalition Building in the Republican Party"

Adriane Bilous, Fordham U.

Sharing seemingly similar conservative views, evangelicals within the New Christian Right actively pursued conservative Catholics as potential allies in an attempt to strengthen the Christian voting bloc within the Republican Party. This paper addresses the central question of why was a lasting alliance between Catholics and NCR evangelicals not maintainable? In an engagement with rational choice theory and social movements' literatures, I address coalition building among religious conservatives in the Republican Party. First, I demonstrate that an internal diversity of value systems exists between Catholics - an internal diversity that impedes a widespread consensus among Catholics. This internal diversity manifests itself in a variety of opinions among key NCR platforms (ex: abortion, gay rights, etc.). Internal diversity leads to an environment that does not lend itself to a strong collective Catholic identity and thus hinders fruitful alliances with other conservative Christians. Second, although Catholics and evangelicals may share some similar values, these limited similarities do not result in strong shared ideologies that would translate into shared political practices. Finally, I argue that Catholics might not enter into a coalition due to the associated costs (such as potential compromises to Catholic values) that are necessary to ensure a successful alliance.

"Evangelical Protestants and Views on Racial Inequality"

Stephen Merino, Penn State U.

Marylee C. Taylor, Pace U.

Influential recent research suggests that white evangelical Protestants are disproportionately likely to reject structural explanations and favor individual explanations for racial inequality. This religious group is said to possess a cultural "tool kit" that emphasizes the importance of individual accountability and personal relationships, leading to anti-structural views of social problems, including racial inequality. Our examination of recent General Social Survey (GSS) data suggests that net of appropriate controls, white evangelical Protestants' explanations of racial inequality are no different from those of mainline Protestants or Catholics.

Comparisons that don't take account of the somewhat lower education of evangelical Protestants and their clustering in Southern states, or that contrast this group with all other whites, including non-Christians, produce misleading results. Evangelical Protestants do show significantly lower support than mainline Protestants, Catholics, and those with no religious preference on one version of a GSS question about spending on blacks. We ask whether this reveals negative racial attitudes among evangelical Protestants or opposition to programs for reducing inequality and poverty in general. Our research also asks whether differences between evangelical Protestants and others are moderated by education.

"The Role of Church-State Conflict in Vitality of Secular Activism and Membership"

Paul Perl, Georgetown U.

Richard Cimino, Religion Watch

Conflict or perceived threat from external religious groups may spur people to become more active in their own religion. Do similar processes take place among people with a secular outlook? We examine county-level data on membership in two national organizations that work for separation of church and state. One organization advocates a non-theist and even anti-religious position. We conceptualize its membership as reflecting a high level of mobilization among the non-religious population. By comparison, the other organization remains neutral regarding the validity of any particular religion, while resisting Christian right influence on the state. Its members, though similarly mobilized, are drawn from a wider portion of the population, including many who are religious. We hypothesize that localized threats from the government and Christian right will predict higher membership in both organizations, with some variation based on the organizations' differences. Analyses use the proportion of white evangelical adherents among the county population as an indicator of Christian right threat. Analyses also include state level measures of secular-religious conflict, among them: policies related to religious freedom, establishment/free-exercise claims brought to court by religious minorities, and state ballot initiatives. We also test alternative explanations, for example that high membership rates are less a reflection of localized church-state conflict than of liberal political climates.

"Voting to Repress: The 47th Congress and the Mormons"

David Smith, U. Michigan

This paper explores the Congressional voting patterns around the Edmunds Act of 1882, which effectively disfranchised Mormons and constituted one of the most serious assaults on religious liberty in US history. In particular, I examine why Southern Democrats formed the main opposition to the act, despite the illiberal attitudes and voting records of most of these congressmen, and the fact that their constituents were very hostile to Mormons. Using qualitative analysis of floor speeches and quantitative analysis of the final vote, I find that Southern Democrats overwhelmingly identified with agrarian economic interests, and as such were more sensitive than Northerners to the strategic dangers of the Edmunds Act -- that disfranchising Mormons, who mainly voted Democratic, would carve out a Republican enclave in the West that could later be admitted as a state, thus cementing Republican

control of the senate. Northern Democrats, while somewhat concerned about this possibility, were more likely to identify with the same economic interests as Republicans, and thus felt less threatened by long-term Republican dominance and were more free to vote on ideational, anti-Mormon grounds.

SUNDAY, 10:15 - 11:45 AM

SESSION 10A: Faith-Based Commerce: The Economic Impact of Religious Institutions

Convener/Discussant: Jared Rubin, Cal State, Fullerton

"Irrational Exuberance in the US Housing Market: Were Evangelicals Left Behind?"

Christopher Crowe, International Monetary Fund

The recent spectacular boom-bust cycle in U.S. house prices has reignited interest in psychology-based theories of speculative excess (Shiller, 2007). This paper attempts to shed some light on this issue by identifying a segment of the U.S. population -- evangelical protestants -- that may be less prone to speculative motives, and uncovers a significant negative relationship between their population share and house price volatility. Evangelicals' tendency to prioritize spiritual over economic objectives could account for this difference, but their focus on Biblical prophecy could provide an additional channel, by enabling evangelicals to interpret otherwise negative events, such as 9/11, as containing positive news about the probability of Christ's return, and therefore dampening the response of house prices to shocks. I provide robust evidence for this channel using data from a popular internet measure of 'prophetic activity' and also from a 9/11 case study. Based on these results, I estimate that almost 90 percent of the difference in house price volatility (measured using the coefficient of variation) between areas with the high and low evangelical populations could be accounted for by the attenuating effect of 'end times' beliefs. This paper therefore contributes to an emerging literature on the role of religion as a form of insurance (Scheve and Stasavage, 2006a and 2006b). JEL Classifications: E21, R21, Z12.

"Word of Mouth Learning in Mormon Congregations"

Graton Gathright, U. of California - San Diego
Christopher Wignall, UC San Diego

When people choose between options with unknown payoffs, they often turn to their social network for information. We analyze this information seeking by members of Latterday Saint (Mormon) congregations as they choose real estate agents to list their homes. We show that the average home seller is twice as likely to choose the same real estate agent as his neighbor if that neighbor is assigned to the same congregation. We also show that these decisions are responsive to information that is not publicly available, implying that the learning is through direct word of mouth communication.

"Investor Loyalty of Religious Mutual Fund Investors"

Jared Peifer, Cornell U.

Amid increased attention to corporate social responsibility and socially responsible investing (SRI), fifteen religious mutual fund families in the U.S. have given religious followers the ability to explicitly combine their religious values with their mutual fund investments. For instance, Muslims can invest in a mutual fund that does not have any

pork-producing or interest-earning firms in its investment portfolio. The convergence of religious values and market concerns creates a ripe area for sociological research. The main research question I will pursue is whether religious fund investors are more likely to continue investing despite low returns than non-religious fund investors. I propose to present the results of an analysis to be performed on mutual fund data provided by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Coding mutual funds as religious SRI, non-religious SRI and conventional; I will analyze the religious impact on mutual fund flow, which Bollen (2007) uses as a proxy for aggregate investor loyalty. I will also be able to verify if religious funds, on average, tend to underperform their non-religious counterparts by using the Carhart (1997) asset pricing model. This quantitative analysis will be supplemented with qualitative data collected from personal interviews with religious fund representatives. Bollen, Nicolas P. B. 2007. Mutual Fund Attributes and Investor Behavior. *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis* 42, (3): 683. Carhart, Mark M. 1997. On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance. *The Journal of Finance* 52, (1): 57-82.

SESSION 10B: Religion and Society

Convener/Discussant: Michael Makowsky, Towson U.

"Pentecostalism's Growth in Religiously Restricted Environments"

Brian Grim, Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life

The Christian renewalist movement is the growing edge of the world's largest religion because it can grow in various social environments including in countries where religious freedom is restricted. This paper empirically explores several hypotheses using new data from the Pew Research Center. First, does the renewalist emphasis on signs and wonders allow it to adapt to and be adopted in places where other local religions emphasize the miraculous? Second, others have suggested that the renewalist movement speaks to the needy, offering them hope for tomorrow and power for today. Empirically, is its presence positively associated with such things as low human development and high income inequality? An third, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the move to a market economy in China removed some formal regulations placed on religion, but also lowered social restrictions placed on the choice and change of religious affiliation. Is social religious deregulation an important predictor of the growth of renewalist movements in situations where government restrictions remain high? This paper also explores whether the Third Wave or Neocharismatic branch of the renewalist movement is able to grow in more restrictive environments than traditional Pentecostals and mainline Charismatics.

"Growth Trends Among the Old Order Amish: An Analysis of the Components of Change"

Benjamin McKune, Penn State U.

Against the backdrop of sub-replacement fertility in Europe and declining fertility in the United States, the Old Order Amish continue to experience high rates of fertility unrivaled in the Western world, with some settlements doubling in size every 18-23 years (Ericksen et al., 1979; Greska, 2002). Yet despite these unprecedented levels of growth, there remains a conspicuous lack of large-scale demographic studies on growth trends among the Old Order Amish. Until recently, many researchers believed that a large-scale, quantitative study of the Amish was unfeasible. However, many Amish settlements keep detailed records of births,

marriages, and reproductive histories that are collected published in commercially available directories. The data for this study comes from a series of Amish directories published in 1965, 1973, 1981, 1988, 1996 and 2000 that include most Older Order Amish families and communities living in the Greater Holmes County Area of Ohio, which includes roughly 1/6th of all Amish adherents living in North America. In order to improve on previous studies, the data will be entered into a genealogical database so that trends fertility, mortality, and immigration can be examined across generations. The analysis will begin with basic descriptive statistics that describe the rapid growth of the Old Order Amish over the past forty years. We will then analyze the individual components of change which are the (presumably) high birth rates, the declining death rates, and the increasing rates of migration, and we will determine how much each of these components contributes to the growth of the Old Order Amish population in Holmes County as a whole. Finally, we will make a series of population projections based on different assumptions.

for Taiwan and for mainland China. Implications of this paper are discussed.

"Religious Decision-Making on Life Cycle Events"

Ariela Keysar, Trinity College

Even people who are not religious in their daily lives often opt to have religious ceremonies at critical moments of their lives: birth, marriage and death. Life cycle events are considered universal personal milestones; however, they are often absent from the study of American religion and religious decision-making. Our hypothesis is that those who switched out of religion in adulthood are more likely to choose religious ceremonies than those born and raised with no religion. But the first group is probably less likely than those who are currently religious to opt for a religious marriage or expect a religious funeral. Additional intriguing research questions to be explored are the role of demographics, such as age, gender and educational level as well as religious identification. The data are from the new American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS) 2008, which will be completed in December. It will shed light for the first time on religious decision-making of Americans regarding life cycle events. ARIS 2008 replicates the methodology of ARIS 2001 and is carried out by the same research team. Thus beyond the time series it provides, it will add new insights into social behavior.

"Does Religion Have the Individual Level Effect? Risk Preference and Religiosity in Taiwan"

Eric Y. Liu, Baylor U.

It has been claimed that religion has an effect on conformity only as an aspect of groups (Hirschi and Stark 1969; Stark 1984; Stark and Bainbridge 1996). In accord with this perspective, previous research showed that the relationship between individuals' risk preference and religiosity is very weak or absent in the Eastern societies dominated by low risk religions, which do not conceive of disaffiliation and nonparticipation as a form of deviant, risk taking behavior (Miller 2000; Miller and Stark 2002). Based on data from two national representative surveys of residents in Taiwan and China, respectively, this study reassesses the general risk preference theory in two distinct cultural settings, Buddhist Taiwan and China's Marxist-atheist monopoly, with a focus on the largest religious group, the Chinese Buddhists. Results were exciting: there was a strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship between risk preference and all of the religiosity measures at the individual level both