

GOD AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: RELIGION AND ATTITUDES TOWARD TRADE AND IMMIGRATION

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Abstract

Using individual survey data of U.S. residents, we test the impact of religious affiliation on attitudes toward trade and immigration policies. Our results show that, although there is a great deal of heterogeneity among the major Protestant denominations, in general religious affiliation is a significant determinant of individual international-policy preferences. Specifically, members of the three largest U.S. denominations, Catholics, Baptists, and Methodists, are more likely to favor policies that restrict imports into the United States. We find evidence that views on these issues differ among pre-Vatican II Catholics and post-Vatican II Catholics, and among Baptist and non-Baptist African Americans. Hence, religion is an important form of identity and may represent an important source of resistance to greater economic integration.

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Introduction

Since Max Weber's study of the Protestant ethic, scholars from a wide variety of academic disciplines have debated the effects of religion on a nation's economic performance. Recently there is a renewed attention to the relationship between religion, international relations, openness and economic growth [for summaries of the literature see Welch and Mueller (2001), Dark (2000), Iannoccone (1998), and Smith and Sawkins (1998)]. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) and Barro and McCleary (2003), for example, show that affiliation with certain religious denominations correlates with individual attitudes, such as trust for the government and thriftiness that are conducive to higher economic growth. Empirical evidence also shows the importance of trade and immigration policies for economic growth. What is yet to be empirically examined, however, is if there is a linkage between religious affiliation and individuals' attitudes toward trade and immigration policies.

Grossman and Helpman (2000), make clear the importance of understanding societal ideas and preferences and the role of special interest groups in shaping international policy. Yet, Philpott (2002) argues that until September 11, international political-economy scholars have paid relatively little attention to the role of religion. A recent study on American views of globalization (PIPA, 2000), however, shows that views on globalization are affected by moral beliefs and varying degrees of confidence in a market-based system.¹ Some also take the view that globalization is a threat to religious beliefs as in that globalization leads to "foreign" values supplanting local ones (*Foreign Policy*, 2004). In this study we examine the relationship between an individual's affiliation with a particular religious denomination and their preferences over trade and immigration policies. In a manner similar to Milner (1988), we focus on individual attitudes and not policymakers' actions and, therefore, do not account completely for trade and immigration policy outcomes. In our review, we offer some suggestions on how

religious affiliation may influence individuals' attitudes on these issues; thereby indirectly affecting economic performance and policy outcomes. Implicitly, we follow Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales who argue that religious beliefs are low frequency variables—based on religious teachings and conditioned by the cultural environment of the religion—that affect adherents' attitudes toward the economic system. This view is perhaps best represented by a recent *Financial Times* article (Financial Times, May 14, 2004, p. 4) on the impact of international trade on the U.S. economy in which a textile worker is quoted as saying:

“I am very worried about the ways things are going. The jobs are disappearing. We need to get back to a biblical perspective of taking care of our own.”

Though trade and immigration policy decisions do not hinge on public opinion alone, they are an important element in international policymaking [see Graham (1994) for a forceful argument]. We also argue that religious affiliation is an important and often neglected force that shapes and reinforces these attitudes.

Our empirical results, in general, show that religious affiliation is indeed a statistically significant determinant of trade and immigration-policy preferences. Specifically, individuals who identify themselves as Catholic, Baptist, or Methodist are more likely to favor policies that restrict imports. Regarding Catholics, however, we show that there is a statistically significant difference in the attitudes of pre-Vatican II Catholics and post-Vatican II Catholics. Likewise there is strong evidence that African Americans affiliated with Baptist denominations are more likely to favor policies that restrict imports while African Americans not affiliated with a Baptists denomination do not. We also find that Methodists who reside in the south are more likely to oppose policies that increase legal immigration while post-Vatican II Catholics are more likely to favor such policies. The heterogeneity of our results shows the importance of disaggregating Protestant denominations and controlling for changes in attitudes that occurred among older and younger Catholics. Furthermore, previous research that ignored the role of religion may have overstated the importance of other factors such as race and region.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I we discuss the recent and relevant literature on the economic consequences of religious participation and in Section II we outline recent models of individual preferences for trade and immigration policies. In Section III we describe the data used in the study. In Section IV we illustrate the connections among demographic and cultural characteristics and an individual's religious affiliation. In Section V we explain our econometric approach and provide results and offer a conclusion and suggestions for further research in Section VI.

I. The Economic Outcomes of Religious Affiliation

In an extensive survey, Iannaccone (1998) separates studies of economics and religion into three categories. The first line of research deals with the micro-foundations of religious participation, the second addresses the economic consequences or outcomes of religious participation, while the third line of research invokes religious teachings to critique economic policies. This study is in keeping with the second area of research and, for space considerations, it is this sort of research we review. The reader is otherwise referred to Iannaccone.

A. Empirical Studies

There are a number of prominent empirical studies of the economic consequences of religious affiliation in the literature. Lowry (1998), for example, considers religious participation and choice of membership in environmental groups. The premise is that religious affiliation is in keeping with an individual's beliefs about "the good society" and is therefore reflected in the specific policies the affiliation espouses. Lowery also argues that the strength of an individual's religious affiliation may, in turn, affect the degree of their policy convictions. He finds that the number of members per household of Judeo-Christian denominations has a negative and significant effect on state membership rates to groups advocating policies in favor of environmental preservation. Further, the results suggest that religious affiliation will positively affect membership to sportsmen groups advocating private stewardship of natural resources.

Glaeser and Glendon (1998) test Max Weber's view that economic growth differs among predominately Protestant nations relative to that of Catholic nations. They find that, on average, religious

beliefs are conducive to higher per capita income and growth after controlling for individual characteristics such as health status, age, gender, education, income, and perceived social status, as well as country fixed effects. Barro and McCleary (2003) find that economic growth responds positively to enhanced religious beliefs, but negatively to increased participation, even while controlling for possible reverse causation. In a similar manner, Mehanna (2002) finds that countries whose dominant faith is Protestant tend to be more open, as measured by imports as a percentage of GDP, than Catholic or Muslim nations. In addition, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales examine the impact of religion on attitudes toward several issues including a trust of government, women working, and thriftiness. They find that Christian religious beliefs are associated with “good” economic attitudes and that religious effects differ across religious denominations.

Regarding religiosity, Smith and Sawkins (1998) attempt to explain the difference in religious participation across countries controlling for a Catholic monopoly in some nations and the retention rate of adult participation. Greater religious human capital and markets where multiple religions are competing for followers tend to increase membership retention. Gwin and North (2002) are more specific in their study of cross-country differences in religiosity. They find that the establishment of a state sanctioned religion reduces religiosity while constitutional protection of religious participation increases religiosity. Barro and McCleary also find a negative correlation between government regulations on religion and religious participation.

B. Religion and International Policies

If indeed religion is important to economic performance, what is the process through which religious beliefs eventually move into policy outcomes? Important works that form the theoretical groundwork include Gay (1991), Legee and Kellstedt (1993), Hofrenning (1995), Jelen and Wilcox (2002), Bane and Mead (2003), Bearce (2003), and Blank and McGurn (2004). Amstutz (2001), however, focuses specifically on the role of religion in shaping foreign policy and provides a helpful outline for framing our analysis.

According to Amstutz, there are three ways that religious organizations can affect foreign policy. First, they directly affect foreign policy as institutions. Nearly 70 percent of Americans claim a membership with a church or synagogue, making religion the largest voluntary association in the United States. In the 1960s, 40 percent of members said that their churches should participate in the political process. This grew to more than 50 percent by the 1990s. Hence, there is an exchange between religious leaders and their members that permits religious organizations to lobby (in one way or another) for policy actions.

Second, religious organization may also affect foreign policy through ideas. Because religious organizations deal with issues such as equality, just war, and subsidiarity, they can help to illuminate and influence perceptions of globalization and facilitate debate on foreign-policy issues. As a result, religious values and moral norms play an indirect, not direct, role in the formation of foreign policy by affecting the attitudes of individuals and thereby shaping public opinion. In turn, public opinion, as argued by Graham (1994), is an important influence on foreign-policy decision making. Finally, because religious organizations provide important humanitarian assistance, they can affect foreign policy through service.

We argue that this second avenue of influence is important for trade and immigration policy decisions, in spite of the fact that there is little in the literature to date that examines the link between religious affiliation and attitudes toward global economic policies. Gay (1991) is one of the few exceptions to this, and yet his assessment of the evangelical debate over capitalism is based on statements by “intellectuals” and admittedly not rank and file members. This approach implicitly assumes a specific micro-socialization mechanism that translates religious participation into policy preferences. That is, adherents simply follow direct cues of religious leaders. As examples of the types of cues that may be offered from the pulpit, consider the 2000 General Conference amendments to the social principles of the United Methodist Church, which included the statement:

“Increasingly economies of nations are related through the international economy. There is the rise of globalization through multinational corporations. Countervailing powers need to be developed to counteract exploitation by these corporations.”

Also, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (2002) statement on international trade maintains that:²

“Trade liberalization is designed to open markets and increase general economic welfare by promoting efficiency of production and hence increasing the availability and reducing the cost of goods and services. However, trade liberalization, while it may produce job gains in some areas, can produce job losses and family and community dislocation in other areas and can also lead to environmental degradation. There is also a growing concern that trade rules may unduly benefit investors in some countries to the detriment of workers and the economies of poorer countries creating a widening gap between rich and poor.”

Nonetheless, coherent and consistent statements, such as those above, are not that prevalent. Hence, in contrast to Guy’s approach, we follow Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales who argue that religious beliefs are low frequency variables—based on religious teachings and conditioned by the cultural environment of the religion—that affect adherents’ attitudes toward the economic system and do not necessarily reflect literal messages found in sacred texts or in statements by religious leaders. Furthermore, we argue that attitudes toward trading with “others” and accepting “others” into the local economy will likely differ across religious denominations because, as Legee (1993) asserts, some religions are world accepting while others are not, some religions are tolerant and accepting while others avoid those who do not follow a singular religious path, and some are humanitarian in their approach to others while other denominations believe that misfortune is a just settlement awarded by a judging God.

II. Modeling Individual Trade and Immigration Policy Preferences

Recent examinations of trade and immigration-policy preferences focus on two common theories or models of international trade policy preferences: the Ricardo-Viner model and the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Both theories consider the effect of increased trade on input factors’ returns and provide a framework to explain how individuals evaluate the effect of international trade on their income. Because the literature is extensive, we focus only on the most recent and otherwise refer the interested reader to the surveys provided in Scheve and Slaughter (2001a and 2001b) and Daniels and von der Ruhr (2003).

Scheve and Slaughter employ individual-level survey data for the United States to identify if individual skill level or factor type is a significant determinant of trade-policy preferences. In the course of their analysis, they make an important contribution by showing that education, income, and employment classification all serve as a proxy measure of skill level. Hence, only one of these variables should be included in any model of trade or immigration policy preferences. Their major finding is that factor type rather than sector of employment influences trade and immigration-policy preferences. Other demographic characteristics, entered as tests of the robustness of factor type, such as gender, race, and trade union membership were also found to be significant determinants.

Daniels and von der Ruhr directly extend the analysis of Scheve and Slaughter to ten advanced economies. Using both education and relative earnings as alternative measure of individual skill level, they find that skill is a robust determinant of individual preferences on immigration policies across countries. In two additional and broader cross-country working papers, Mayda and Rodrik (2001) apply ordered estimation techniques to explain attitudes toward trade and immigration using education as a measure of the individual's level of skill while O'Rourke and Sinnott (2001) use the individual's occupation classification. Both papers find support for the factor endowment model.

III. Survey Data

The data employed in this study are the results of a survey conducted and compiled by Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung. The survey is part of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) and is titled *ISSP: National Identity*.³ It contains the most current international survey data available on a broad range of global issues. The results of this survey are combined and matched with data of the individual's religious affiliation found in the General Social Survey (GSS) to form our complete data set.

A. Missing Data

Our first difficulty lies in addressing the problem of missing values, a common problem in empirical treatments of survey data. (The number of missing values for the data used here can be found in Tables 1 and 2.) There are basically two approaches to handling missingness. The first approach is to omit the

cases with missing values. This approach may result in biased estimates if the deleted cases systematically differ from the observed cases, however, and also reduces the efficiency of estimates because important information is lost.

The most common alternative is to impute values for missing data. This approach does not assume that the missing data is missing at random; rather it generates correct uncertainty estimates conditional on the data used to impute missing values. To generate data sets with imputed values for missing data we use the EMis algorithm of *Amelia: A Program for Missing Data*, by Honaker *et al.* (2000). The reader is referred to King *et al.* (2001) for a detailed description of the advantages of this approach and the EMis algorithm.

The process of imputing values involves three steps. The first step is to generate multiple data sets containing imputed values for missing data. Based on the size of our data set and following King *et al.*, we generate five data sets that are used for all applications in this study. The second step is to estimate a regression model for all of the imputed data sets, thereby creating multiple coefficient estimates. The final step is to combine the estimated coefficients and standard errors. It is important to point out that among the more than 1300 observations, there are only two missing observations for religious affiliation. These individuals were removed from the data set and, therefore, we do not impute any values for religious affiliation.

B. Description of the Dependent Variables

The first survey item used in this study asks: “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The United States should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy?” The second item asks: “Do you think the number of immigrants to the United States nowadays should be increased or decreased?” Table 1 provides the survey items on policy preferences and summarizes the responses.

Table 1

C. Description of the Independent Variables

Following the literature cited in the previous section, we control for a number of factors that may shape an individual's global economic policy preferences. In general, we control for demographics, individual skill level, and political ideology, while testing the significance of religious affiliation and religiosity. Each variable is described below and summary data is provided in Table 2.

Table 2

1. Demographic Variables

Female is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of unity for female and zero for male, *Age* is a continuous variable, measured in years, and *Non-Citizen* is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is a citizen with a value of zero or non-citizen with a value of unity. Previous studies find evidence, though not consistently significant, indicating that women are more likely to support trade barriers, but that gender is not a significant determinant of immigration-policy preferences. It is hypothesized that older respondents are more likely to favor policies that restrict international trade and immigration, though age has not been shown to be a consistently significant determinant of global economic policy preferences. It is expected that non-citizens are more likely to oppose policies that restrict trade and favor policies that increase immigration.

South is a dummy variable for the south U.S Census region. Individuals in the other three regions, therefore, serve as the benchmark for the estimated differential impact of the south. The research on religion and economic growth indicates that a dominant religion affects the culture of a nation and may be the source of cross-country differences in attitudes toward markets and market processes. Hence, if a particular religion dominates a *region* of a nation, we may see a regional effect that is actually reflecting the influence of the dominant religion. Previous research finds that the type of industry the individual is employed in is not a significant determinant of their trade-policy preferences and individuals who live in “gateway” communities—communities that are typical destinations of immigrants—are not more likely to oppose immigration.

African American is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of unity if the respondent is African American and zero otherwise. *Hispanic* is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of unity if the respondent is Hispanic and zero otherwise. The literature provides mixed evidence on the role of race and ethnicity as determinants of trade and immigration policy preferences. *Union Member* indicates if the respondent and / or their spouse is a member of a trade union with a value of unity and zero otherwise. Numerous studies of U.S. residents conclude that trade union members are more likely to favor restricting international trade, but union membership is not a significant determinant of immigration-policy preferences.⁴

2. Political Ideology

Previous studies show that those who identify with the left (right) are more (less) likely to favor policies that restrict trade. On the other hand, those who identify their political ideology to the right (left) are more (less) likely to favor policies that restrict immigration. [For a comprehensive discussion of political ideology and attitudes toward globalization see Steger (2002 Chapter 4).] Similar to previous studies, we model *Political Ideology* with a categorical variable that ranges from unity (indicating someone who views their political ideology as far left), to five (indicating someone views their political ideology as far right).

3. Individual Skill Level

Scheve and Slaughter (2001b) show that, if controlling for political ideology and demographic characteristics, education or earnings are appropriate measures of labor market skills and should be included as an economic factor as opposed to a demographic factor. More importantly, they show that education and earnings should not be included in the same model. Because of space consideration and the number of missing values that were imputed for earnings (294 as opposed to 3 for education), we use education as a proxy measure of individual skill throughout the paper. Nonetheless, in general, our results are the same for both education and earnings (available upon request). *Education* is a continuous variable that indicates the number of years of schooling the respondent has completed. Based on standard

trade theory, described earlier, respondents with lower levels of education (skill) are more likely to agree with policy actions that restrict trade and immigration.

4. Religious Affiliation

The survey instrument asked individuals if they belong to a major religious group. There were approximately 30 denominations the individual could identify with including Catholic, Jewish, Moslem, various Protestant denominations, Shinto, Hindu, Buddhist, and Sikh. Individuals were also allowed to select no affiliation or to refuse to answer. In our sample, individuals identified with Catholic, Jewish, Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran, Episcopalian, other Protestant, one as Hindu (removed from the dataset because of a lack of observations), no religious affiliation, and two refused to answer (and were removed from the dataset). The distribution of the sample (1,367 respondents) among these major denominations was Roman Catholic 23 percent, Jewish 2 percent, Baptist 22 percent, Methodist 9 percent, Lutheran 7 percent, Episcopal 2 percent, other Protestant 15 percent, other Christian denomination 5 percent and no denomination or affiliation 4 percent. The GSS, which administers the ISSP in the United States, provides some additional coding for individuals that took part in the ISSP. Using this additional coding allows us to separate Presbyterians from the “other” Protestant category.

As part of our empirical examination, we consider the potential impact of the Second Vatican Council because it represents a significant change in Catholic Social Teaching and marks a period of changing trends with a decline in the religiosity of Catholics, as measured by frequency of attendance, and a decrease in the percentage of Catholics that attended a Catholic school (Sander, 2001). The National Council of Catholic Bishops was also created after Vatican II and is a vehicle for pastoral letters on social and economic issues. If indeed religious affiliation is an important determinant of individual attitudes, then these important changes should be reflected in the data. Specifically, we expect post-Vatican II Catholics to have more moderate attitudes toward trade and immigration policies.

IV. The Intersection of Religion, Race, Ethnicity, and Region

There are both strengths and pitfalls to testing inter-denominational differences among the major Protestant denominations. On the one hand, by disaggregating to the major Protestant denominations, we allow for heterogeneity of attitudes among Protestants. Studies that do not allow for these differences, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) for example, likely underestimate the importance of religion. On the other hand, for example, we test Baptist as a single denomination, even though one may argue that the views of, say, the American Baptist Churches differ from those of the Southern Baptist Convention. According to Smith (1987 and 1990), regional and racial dummy variables may approximate denominational subdivisions, capturing some of the intra-denominational variation. Regional controls, for example, may provide some limited insight into differences specific to the Southern Baptist Convention and the American Baptist Churches and racial cohort groups may give us limited insight into the views of the National Baptist Convention USA, and the National Baptist Convention.⁵ Before proceeding further, therefore, we must first acknowledge the potential for strong connections among race, ethnicity, region, and religious affiliation.

Our sample reflects an obvious intersection of race, ethnicity and affiliation. Baptist is the dominant major denomination among African Americans, with more than half professing an affiliation with the faith. The second largest response was no religious affiliation at all. There is an even stronger dominant faith among Hispanics with 64 percent affiliated with Catholicism. As with African Americans, the second largest response was no religious affiliation.

Participation within a particular religious affiliation centers on congregating at a particular place, or one's place of worship (one's local church, parish, or synagogue). Hence, there is likely to be a strong connection between region and religious affiliation as some regions have a religion that is dominant over others (as measured by the number of affiliates). This is easily seen on a national basis, for example, with Catholicism dominant in the southern region of Europe and Protestantism dominant in the north.

It can be argued that a dominant religious affiliation does not exist in the United States because of its unique religious diversity. Nonetheless, a dominant religion may exist at a regional level. As shown in Table 3, slightly more than 60 percent of the Baptists and 45 percent of the Methodists in the sample

residing in the South. In contrast, over 50 percent of Lutherans reside in the Midwest region. Though there is less of a regional concentration among Catholics, 35 percent reside in the Northeast.

Table 3

In the cross-country studies described above, a religion is defined as “dominant” if it has a higher number of affiliates than any other denomination, or a relative majority. Based on a relative majority, Catholic dominates the Northeast, accounting for 40 percent of the respondents in this region. Protestantism dominates the Midwest, South, and West accounting for 55 percent, 74 percent and 40 percent of residents respectively. Disaggregating into the major Protestant denominations we find that Baptist dominates the South accounting for 39 percent of all respondents, while Catholic dominates the Midwest and the West, but for only 25 percent and 23 percent of residents respectively. We expect, therefore, that controlling for a regional effect through the use of a dummy variable without controlling for religious affiliation will unintentionally pick up the effect—if one exists—that a dominant religion has within a region. For example, a control for the south region will reflect the dominance of Protestant denominations and associations in this region, as well as other unique characteristics of this region. Our approach therefore, will be to introduce religious affiliation in a stepwise manner and then employ cohort groups so as to fully appreciate the interaction of these variables.

V. Econometric Results

Our objective is to determine if an individual’s religious affiliation holds any additional insight into their trade and immigration-policy preferences. Our approach, therefore, is to add religious affiliation and religiosity to the models of international-policy preferences described earlier, thereby controlling for other important individual demographic, economic, and political characteristics.

The previous section of this paper argued that the individual’s affiliation, race, ethnicity, and region might have important interactions. To try to understand these interactions we estimate four different models. The first model is a base model that allows us to benchmark the results of our data and allow comparison with the literature. The second model adds the individual’s religious affiliation and a

measure of religiosity to control for the strength of the individual's affiliation. To examine the intersection among affiliation and race, the third model separates Baptists and African Americans into three cohort groups; African Americans that are Baptist, African Americans that are not Baptist, and Baptists that are not African American. We would like to do the same for Hispanics and Catholics, but we do not have enough non-Catholic Hispanics in our sample to generate reliable estimates.

The fourth model separates the two largest Protestant denominations into south and non-south cohorts to further test the interaction of region and religion. This could also be done by interacting the dummy variables.⁶ The cohort group approach, however, has similarities with the classification system of Roof and McKinney (1987), motivating questions for future research as discussed in the conclusion. Finally, in a separate set of regressions, we construct cohort groups to test for an impact of changes centered around the time of the Second Vatican Council.

Given that the multiple categories of responses to the survey questions follow a natural order, we employ ordered probit (OP) model. The five imputed data sets were used to generate the OP estimates for every regression. Following Honaker *et al.*, (2000), model coefficients are the mean estimates of the five imputed data sets. The standard errors are found by averaging the mean standard error across the five data sets, combining this value with the standard error across the five data sets, which is adjusted for the fact that the number of observations is less than infinity. We, therefore, not only allow for uncertainty of the point estimates, but also for the uncertainty of the imputed values.

A. Attitudes Toward International Trade

Table 4 provides the estimates for the survey item on whether the United States should restrict imports. As with other ordered choice models, the estimated coefficients of the ordered probit model are notoriously difficult to interpret. In this section we discuss only the coefficients that are significant. In section *D*, we simulate the marginal effects of the key variables.

The results of the base model, model 1, indicate that union members, African Americans and lower-skilled individuals are more likely to agree with policies that restrict imports, while non-citizens and Hispanics are more likely to disagree with restrictions.

Model 2 shows that Catholics, Baptists, and Methodists are also more likely to favor policies that restrict imports. The measure of religiosity is not significant, however, in this or any other model of trade-policy preferences.⁷ Adding religious affiliation made African American insignificant in the model, whereas Hispanic remained significant. Hence, model 2 provides evidence a religious dimension.

Model 3 shows the interaction between Baptist and African American. Both African-American Baptist and non-African-American Baptist are significant and negative, indicating that these individuals are more likely to favor policies that restrict free trade. The cohort group of African Americans that are not Baptists, however, is not significant, indicating a religious-affiliation variation that occurs among African Americans. This finding supports the claim of Thomas (2000), that religious differences, being fundamental and immutable, are more important sources of difference and identity than race or ethnicity.

Model 4 further examines the interaction of region and religion. Roof and McKinney separate Baptist into those who reside in the south and those who reside elsewhere as a means of distinguishing an individual's religious orthodoxy between conservative and moderate. This allows for an additional regional aspect to Baptists in that the attitudes of Baptists in the south may be statistically different from the attitudes of Baptists in the north due to an additional cultural effect not fully captured in the regional dummy. To test for this difference, we create cohort groups for south Baptists and north Baptists. We expand on this by creating cohort groups for Methodists as well. To test for a statistical difference between the cohort groups, we must combine the coefficients of the regional dummy with the coefficient on the south cohort and test this sum relative to the coefficient on the north cohort.⁸ The regression estimates indicate that there is not a statistical difference between the estimated coefficients for south Baptists and north Baptists and for south Methodists and north Methodists. Hence, we conclude that there is evidence of *both* regional effects and religion effects.

B. Attitudes Toward Immigration

Table 5 provides the estimates for the immigration models. The estimates for the base model indicate that respondents who are non-citizens and Hispanics are more likely to support policies that increase immigration into the respondent's nation, while older respondents, lower-skilled respondents, and

individuals who identify their political ideology to the right are more likely to favor policies that restrict immigration. Adding religious affiliation renders political ideology insignificant. Indeed looking across Table 5 shows that political ideology is insignificant in all of the models that include religious affiliation. In spite of Catholic doctrine that asserts the individual's right to immigrate, Catholic affiliation is not significant in any of the models. No other affiliation is significant in the various models until we separate Methodists regionally. The results indicate that there is a difference between Methodists in the south and those in the north in that south Methodists appear to be more conservative in their views toward immigration.

C. The Second Vatican Council

The Second Vatican Council represents the most significant change in Catholic doctrine and Catholic social teaching in the past 450 years. Following Vatican II there has been a dramatic change in the attitudes of younger Catholics. Scholars such as Roof and McKinney (1987) and Greeley (1981) document the differences in attitudes among older Catholics and younger Catholics on issues such as premarital sex, divorce, and birth control. In addition, both religiosity and the percentage of Catholics attending a parish school declined following Vatican II.⁹ Regarding the impact of Vatican II on economic attitudes, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (page 34) argue that some of the negative impact of Catholicism on economic development no longer exists and that more moderate post-Vatican II Catholicism is not a significant obstacle to economic development.

To investigate a potential Vatican II effect, we follow Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales and separate Catholics into two cohort groups, those born before 1962 and those born after, creating a dummy variable equal to unity if the individual is Catholic and in the particular age-cohort group.¹⁰ (This dummy variable does not conflict with our age variable that is continuous, and remains in the model to capture general age differences.) The results, provided in Table 6, indicate a significant difference between the two cohort groups, with Catholics born before Vatican II favoring policies that restrict imports, while Catholics born after Vatican II are more likely to favor increasing immigration. Arguably, these results provide powerful

evidence of how religious doctrine and social teaching may shape individuals' attitudes toward global economic policies.

D. Interpretation of Model Estimates

To better understand the impact of religious affiliation on global-policy preferences, we simulate the effect of various affiliations and cohort groups so as to isolate the impact on the probability that an individual chooses one of the responses to the survey questions detailed in Table 1 (along the lines suggested in King et al., 2000). The simulations are conducted using *Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results* (Tomz et al., 2001). The process involves drawing 1,000 simulated parameters from an asymptotic sampling distribution that is multivariate normal, and whose mean is equal to the vector of parameter estimates and variance equal to the variance-covariance matrix of estimates. Next the simulated parameters are used to calculate two sets of probabilities.

Using religious affiliation as an example, we first set all explanatory variables at their mean value except for every religious affiliation, which are set at zero. In other words, each individual is treated as if they have no religious affiliation. From this we generate the predicted probability of response to each category of the survey question. Next, we change every individual's affiliation to, say, Baptist and repeat the simulation generating new predicted probabilities. To get a sense of the relative importance of religious affiliation, we include the simulated effects of education—shown in previous studies as a highly significant determinant of trade and immigration-policy attitudes—as a benchmark. The changes in predicted probabilities for variables of interest are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.

1. Policies to Restrict Imports

Figure 1 shows the change in predicted probabilities for the five categories of the question should the United States restrict imports for the regression in Table 4. In general, the figure shows how each variable of interest shifts the distribution of probable responses upward, that is, toward the categories of “agree strongly” and “agree” from the categories of “neither agree nor disagree,” “disagree,” and “disagree strongly.” The mean value of education is approximately 13 years. We change this variable to

its 75th percentile value—slightly more than 16 years—to obtain the marginal effects of education. For south, we set the dummy variable to zero for everyone and then change it to unity for everyone. Increasing an individual’s education from slightly more than a high school degree to slightly more than a college degree reduces the probability that they will respond “agree strongly” or “agree” by 7.7 and 3.6 percent respectively. The effect of the south region is to increase the probability that an individual responds “agree strongly” or “agree” by 7.9 and 1.0 percent respectively. Finally, for religion we set all dummies at zero and then change each, in turn, to unity for each individual. An affiliation with Baptist increases the probability that the individual will respond “agree strongly” by 5.6 percent and “agree” by 1.8 percent, while Methodist affiliation increases the probability by 7.0 and 1.9, and pre-Vatican II Catholic by 10.8 and 2.0 percent respectively. Interestingly, the effect of pre-Vatican II is similar in magnitude to the effect of increasing an individual’s education from slightly more than a high school degree to a college degree and similar in magnitude as the effect of residing in the south region.

Figure 1

2. Policies to Change Immigration Into the Respondent’s Country

Figure 2 illustrates the change in the simulated probabilities for the various response categories for education and post-Vatican II Catholic. The post-Vatican II effect is relatively larger than that for education. As the figure shows, if an individual is Catholic and born after Vatican II, the probability that they support policies that increase immigration a lot or a little increases by 2.5 and 3.1 percent respectively. The probabilities that they would prefer immigration to be decreased a lot or a little declines by 9.4 and 1.4 percent respectively. If an individual has a college degree rather than one year of college, the probabilities that they prefer that immigration to be increased a lot or a little rises by 1 and 1.4 percent respectively.

Figure 2

VI. Conclusion

The objective of this paper is to determine if religious affiliation is an important determinant of preferences for trade and immigration policies. Using the results of a survey of national identity, we test the impact of religious affiliation on trade and immigration-policy preferences and attitudes toward unilateral policy actions while controlling for the individual's level of skill, their political ideology, and other important demographic characteristics. Our results show that individuals who are Catholic, Baptist or Methodist are more likely to prefer policies that restrict imports than individuals who do not claim any religious affiliation. The religious affiliation effect on trade-policy preferences results in a variation within race, as African-American Baptists favor restricting imports, but other African Americans do not. In addition, we find that Catholics born prior to the Second Vatican Council are more likely to support policies that restrict imports, while Catholics born after Vatican II are not more likely to favor these policies, yet more likely to favor increasing immigration.

Based on our results, we conclude that religion does matter, and that the beliefs produced by specific religious denominations shape public opinion toward trade and immigration thereby representing an important source of resistance to deeper cultural interaction. It is our hope that this paper will motivate greater interest in the subject of religion in the context of international policies. We suggest that future research also focus on the mechanism through which religious beliefs and religious participation affect international-policy preferences (perhaps along the lines posited by Montgomery, 1996) and give greater attention to explaining why the effect differs across denominations.

VI. Notes

¹ Jubilee 2000—named after the Old Testament concept of Leviticus 25:10 of returning land back to original owners—is an example of the importance of organized religions on global policy.

² Martin and Laczniak (1989), however, point out the inherent inconsistency between this position and the Bishops concerns for the development of the third world, as protecting jobs in the United States may well be at the expense of developing nations. See Yuengert (2000) for a detailed account of Catholic social teaching on the issue of immigration.

³ Independent institutions in each country collected the data for the ISSP. Neither the original collectors nor the ZENTRALARCHIV bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretation presented here

⁴ This difference is consistent with union positions on these two issues. For example, the AFL-CIO “Agenda For All America” (AFL-CIO, 2002) item (2) is “Keep good jobs and level the playing field. In the past year alone, more than one million manufacturing jobs have fallen victim to flawed trade policies and inadequate protections for workers in the global economy. We must develop an effective strategy and program for stopping the exports of good jobs and reindustrializing the U.S. economy.” While John Sweeney (AFL-CIO, 2000), speaking on the Restoration of Fairness in Immigration Act stated: “The AFL-CIO proudly stands on the side of immigrant workers. Throughout the history of this country, immigrants have played an important role in building our nation and its democratic institutions. New arrivals from every continent have contributed their energy, talent, and commitment to making the United States richer and stronger. Likewise, the American union movement has been enriched by the contributions and courage of immigrant workers. Newly arriving workers continue to make indispensable contributions to the strength and growth of our unions.”

⁵ The Southern Baptist Convention was established in 1845 when slavery became a dividing issue among southern and northern Baptists. The National Baptist Convention USA is the original organization of African American Baptist churches. The National Baptist Convention of America separated from the National Baptist Convention USA in 1915. Of course geographical and racial boundaries have weakened over time.

⁶ We also run the regression with a variable that interacts Baptist and south and Methodist and south. The results are consistent with the results of the cohort group approach, that is both interaction terms are insignificant.

⁷ We tested the model with three different dummy variables for religiosity. The first coded individuals who attend services once a week or more as unity and all others as zero. The second, used in the models shown in the tables, coded individuals who attend services two to three times a month or more as unity and all others as zero. The third used the full six categories of the survey instrument, described in the appendix. All of our results for this variable were, in general, the same.

⁸ Specifically, the null hypotheses are (south + south Baptist) – north Baptist = 0 and (south + south Methodist) – north Methodist = 0. Neither of these can be rejected at even the 10 percent level.

⁹ Our data does not allow us to examine attendance at Catholic schools. The mean value of religiosity for post-Vatican II Catholics, however, is statistically significantly lower than that of pre-Vatican II Catholics.

¹⁰ To test the sensitivity of these results to the year that was picked for constructing the dummy variable, we first moved the year ahead five years and back five years and our results were consistent in terms of sign and significance. Next we created 1962 cohort dummies for the entire non-Catholic population. Both dummy variables were insignificant.

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Table 1: Summary of Dependent Variables

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The United States should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.

Response	1	Agree Strongly
Response	2	Agree
Response	3	Neither Agree nor Disagree
Response	4	Disagree
Response	5	Strongly Disagree
Response	6	Can't Choose, Refused
Mean Response		2.2589
Standard Error of the Mean		0.0282
Number of Respondents		1,367
Observations		1,290

Do you think the number of immigrants to the United States nowadays should be:

Response	1	Increased a Lot
Response	2	Increased a Little
Response	3	Remain the Same
Response	4	Reduced a Little
Response	5	Reduced a lot
Response	6	Can't Choose, Refused
Mean Response		3.8715
Standard Error of the Mean		0.0330
Number of Respondents		1,367
Number of Observations		1,141

Table 2: Summary Description of Demographic, Economic, Ideology, and Religiosity Variables

Variable	Description	Mean	Standard Deviation	Missing Observations
Female	Female=1, Male=0	0.5653	0.4957	0
Non-citizen	Non-Citizen=1, Citizen=0	0.0424	0.2018	25
Age	Years	44.4902	16.5576	4
Education	Years	13.4205	2.8732	3
Earnings	Dollar Amount	19,072.7	9,072.74	294
Union	Member=1, Nonmember=0	0.2002	0.4000	6
Ideology	Far Left=1, Left=2, Centre=3, Right=4, Far Right=5	2.9882	0.8863	2
Religiosity	Once a week or more=1, two-three times a month=2, once a month=3, several times a year=4, less frequently=5, never=6, refused=7	3.3674	1.9147	42
Religion	Nine dummy variables, including Presbyterian. Distribution given in the text.			2

Table 3: Regional Distribution of Religious Affiliation (Column Percentages Shown)

Region	Catholic	Jewish	Baptist	Methodist	Lutheran	Episcopal	Other Protestant	Other Christian
Northeast	35.2	40.6	9.1	13.4	15.1	21.9	18.7	16.4
Midwest	26.1	18.8	19.8	24.4	52.7	12.5	20.7	17.9
South	17.6	25.0	60.4	44.5	15.1	37.5	41.4	16.4
West	21.1	15.6	10.7	17.6	17.2	28.1	19.2	49.3

Distribution based on imputed data sets. The category of "none" is excluded from the calculated distribution.

Table 4: The United States should limit the import of foreign products. Ordered probit results

	1		2		3		4	
	Coefficient	p-Value	Coefficient	p-Value	Coefficient	p-Value	Coefficient	p-Value
Non-citizen	0.4245 [0.1807]	0.024	0.4102 [0.1826]	0.031	0.4112 [0.1819]	0.003	0.415 [0.1823]	0.029
Female	-0.0814 [0.0611]	0.183	-0.0725 [0.0613]	0.237	-0.073 [0.0614]	0.234	-0.0718 [0.0613]	0.241
Age	-0.0029 [0.0019]	0.122	-0.0023 [0.0020]	0.265	-0.0023 [0.0020]	0.267	-0.0023 [0.0020]	0.263
Education	0.1186 [0.0110]	0.001	0.1173 [0.0113]	0.001	0.1174 [0.0113]	0.001	0.1171 [0.0113]	0.001
Union Member	-0.3709 [0.0988]	0.001	-0.3673 [0.0987]	0.001	-0.3681 [0.0979]	0.001	-0.3662 [0.0985]	0.001
Political Ideology	0.0469 [0.0354]	0.185	0.0522 [0.0365]	0.154	0.0523 [0.0365]	0.153	0.0539 [0.0367]	0.142
South	-0.2891 [0.0758]	0.001	-0.2691 [0.0808]	0.002	-0.2695 [0.0812]	0.002	-0.3356 [0.1014]	0.002
African American	-0.2513 [0.1325]	0.059	-0.2101 [0.1336]	0.117				
<i>Baptist</i>					-0.4637 [0.1788]	0.01	-0.4339 [0.1795]	0.016
<i>All Others</i>					-0.167 [0.2005]	0.407	-0.2268 [0.2024]	0.266
Hispanic	0.2957 [0.1690]	0.081	0.342 [0.1683]	0.042	0.343 [0.1683]	0.042	0.3507 [0.1688]	0.038
Catholic			-0.275 [0.1031]	0.008	-0.276 [0.1031]	0.008	-0.2696 [0.1020]	0.009
Jewish			0.0407 [0.2301]	0.86	0.0394 [0.2285]	0.863	0.0538 [0.2308]	0.816
Baptist			-0.2202 [0.1049]	0.036	-0.2126 [0.1087]	0.051		
<i>South</i>							-0.1169 [0.1392]	0.401
<i>All Others</i>							-0.2749 [0.1421]	0.054
Methodist			-0.2582 [0.1313]	0.05	-0.2613 [0.1309]	0.046		
<i>South</i>							-0.0682 [0.1956]	0.727
<i>All Others</i>							-0.3725 [0.1620]	0.021
Lutheran			-0.1643 [0.1453]	0.259	-0.1642 [0.1464]	0.263	-0.1601 [0.1461]	0.275
Episcopalian			0.0056 [0.2189]	0.98	0.0044 [0.2182]	0.984	0.0264 [0.2194]	0.904
Presbyterian			-0.2844 [0.1775]	0.109	-0.2853 [0.1779]	0.109	-0.2578 [0.1769]	0.145
Other Protestant			-0.1756 [0.1287]	0.174	-0.1772 [0.1288]	0.17	-0.1556 [0.1288]	0.228
Other Christian			0.031 [0.1580]	0.845	0.0316 [0.1575]	0.841	0.0365 [0.1574]	0.817
Religiosity			-0.0179 [0.0649]	0.783	-0.018 [0.0650]	0.782	-0.0172 [0.0654]	0.792

Table 5: The number of immigrants to the United States should be... Ordered probit results.

	1		2		3		4	
	Coefficient	p-Value	Coefficient	p-Value	Coefficient	p-Value	Coefficient	p-Value
Non-Citizen	-0.6388 [0.1907]	0.003	-0.6152 [0.1863]	0.003	-0.6149 [0.1861]	0.003	-0.6174 [0.1859]	0.002
Female	0.0875 [0.0611]	0.153	0.0876 [0.0616]	0.155	0.0873 [0.0617]	0.157	0.0905 [0.0619]	0.144
Age	0.0043 [0.0022]	0.058	0.0041 [0.0023]	0.079	0.0041 [0.0023]	0.079	0.0041 [0.0023]	0.082
Education	-0.053 [0.0125]	0.001	-0.0504 [0.0127]	0	-0.0502 [0.0127]	0.001	-0.0504 [0.0127]	0.001
Union	0.0114 [0.1181]	0.925	0.0081 [0.1212]	0.948	0.0077 [0.1220]	0.951	0.0074 [0.1224]	0.953
Left	0.0658 [0.0375]	0.028	0.0562 [0.0376]	0.137	0.0562 [0.0376]	0.137	0.0564 [0.0376]	0.136
South	0.0841 [0.0666]	0.208	0.0666 [0.0751]	0.377	0.0661 [0.0755]	0.384	0.0271 [0.0856]	0.752
African American	-0.1373 [0.1238]	0.268	-0.1551 [0.1266]	0.22				
<i>Baptist</i>					-0.1664 [0.1818]	0.36	-0.1598 [0.1824]	0.381
<i>All Others</i>					-0.1095 [0.1896]	0.564	-0.0601 [0.1904]	0.753
Hispanic	-0.3393 [0.1835]	0.068	-0.3165 [0.1849]	0.091	-0.315 [0.1845]	0.091	-0.3086 [0.1844]	0.098
Catholic			-0.035 [0.0995]	0.725	-0.0357 [0.0993]	0.719	-0.0448 [0.0982]	0.649
Jewish			-0.3253 [0.2260]	0.153	-0.3259 [0.2264]	0.153	-0.3299 [0.2256]	0.147
Baptist			0.0212 [0.1142]	0.853	0.0301 [0.1223]	0.806		
<i>South</i>						0.175	0.0415 [0.1398]	0.766
<i>All Others</i>						0.717	0.037 [0.1610]	0.819
Methodist			0.1914 [0.1391]	0.171	0.1886 [0.1386]	0.734		
<i>South</i>						0.924	0.4208 [0.2109]	0.048
<i>All Others</i>						0.385	0.0287 [0.1697]	0.866
Lutheran			0.0517 [0.1448]	0.721	0.0525 [0.1447]	0.82	0.0447 [0.1441]	0.757
Episcopalian			0.0749 [0.2197]	0.733	0.0747 [0.2198]	0.633	0.0739 [0.2189]	0.736
Presbyterian			0.0192 [0.1927]	0.921	0.0183 [0.1924]		0.0215 [0.1915]	0.911
Other Protestant			0.1117 [0.1270]	0.379	0.1101 [0.1266]		0.107 [0.1254]	0.394
Other Christian			-0.038 [0.1667]	0.82	-0.0379 [0.1666]		-0.0454 [0.1653]	0.784
Religiosity			-0.0327 [0.0680]	0.632	-0.0325 [0.0678]		-0.0267 [0.0673]	0.692

Table 6: Vatican II effect. Ordered probit results.

	Imports		Immigration	
	Coefficient	P-Value	Coefficient	P-Value
Non-Citizen	0.3793 [0.1842]	0.047	-0.5692 [0.1864]	0.005
Female	-0.0733 [0.0613]	0.232	0.0875 [0.0617]	0.156
Age	-0.001 [0.0021]	0.621	0.0021 [0.0024]	0.038
Education	0.1184 [0.0113]	0.001	-0.0517 [0.0127]	0.001
Union	-0.3594 [0.0986]	0.001	-0.0062 [0.1184]	0.959
Left	0.0531 [0.0366]	0.147	0.0552 [0.0376]	0.144
South	-0.2693 [0.0810]	0.002	0.0652 [0.0754]	0.389
African American				
<i>Baptist</i>	-0.244 [0.1739]	0.161	-0.2104 [0.1920]	0.277
<i>All Others</i>	-0.1693 [0.2003]	0.4	-0.105 [0.1897]	0.581
Hispanic	0.3213 [0.1697]	0.059	-0.2797 [0.1849]	0.134
Catholic				
<i>Pre-Vatican II</i>	-0.3663 [0.1178]	0.002	0.1092 [0.1121]	0.33
<i>Post-Vatican II</i>	-0.1143 [0.1326]	0.389	-0.2907 [0.1322]	0.028
Jewish	0.0284 [0.2299]	0.902	-0.3071 [0.2265]	0.178
Baptist	-0.2201 [0.1086]	0.043	0.044 [0.1228]	0.721
Methodist	-0.2762 [0.1309]	0.035	0.2132 [0.1389]	0.126
Lutheran	-0.1764 [0.1457]	0.228	0.073 [0.1448]	0.614
Episcopalian	-0.0111 [0.2185]	0.96	0.1023 [0.2204]	0.643
Presbyterian	-0.3052 [0.1779]	0.096	0.0507 [0.1932]	0.793
Other Protestant	-0.1865 [0.1290]	0.15	0.1251 [0.1270]	0.325
Other Christian	0.0343 [0.1581]	0.828	-0.0427 [0.1667]	0.798
Religiosity	-0.0168 [0.0651]	0.797	-0.0345 [0.0680]	0.612

Figure 1: US Should Restrict Imports




Figure 2: Change in Immigration

